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Day, Dwayne C.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

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# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**A UNIFORM APPROACH TO NATIONAL SUICIDE  
BOMBER INCIDENT RESPONSE AND RECOVERY**

by

Dwayne Day

March 2008

Thesis Advisor:  
Second Reader:

David Brannan  
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**A UNIFORM APPROACH TO NATIONAL SUICIDE BOMBER INCIDENT  
RESPONSE AND RECOVERY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
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## **ABSTRACT**

First responders in the United States are not adequately prepared to respond to a suicide bomber attack. Police, fire, and EMS are using protocols that do not anticipate the unique needs of a suicide bomber response. There is an urgent need to develop and implement a consistent approach for responding to suicide bombers.

This thesis developed a Suicide Bomber Response Framework using International Association of Chiefs of Police training documents as the primary source, along with Technical Support Working Group training materials and recommendations from relevant national training institutions. A Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) full-scale exercise was then conducted for this thesis based on the newly written Framework to identify gaps between current standard operating procedures and operating procedures recommended by the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.

Exercise evaluators identified a significant gap between standard operating procedures of first responders and the recommended response procedures in the Suicide Bomber Response Framework. The thesis argues that a unified suicide bomber response approach should be instituted nation-wide. The Suicide Bomber Response Framework would serve as the tool for responding agencies to develop consistent response plans necessary for this critical public safety concern.



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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ANG</b>	Air National Guard
<b>BLS</b>	Basic Life Support
<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<b>EMS</b>	Emergency Medical Service
<b>EMT</b>	Emergency Medical Technician
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>EOP</b>	Emergency Operation Plan
<b>FAA</b>	Federal Aviation Administration
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>HSEEP</b>	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
<b>HSPD</b>	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
<b>IACP</b>	International Association of Chiefs of Police
<b>IAP</b>	Incident Action Plan
<b>ICS</b>	Incident Command System
<b>IDF</b>	Israeli Defense Fund
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>ISA</b>	Israeli Security Agency
<b>IV</b>	Intravenous
<b>LTTE</b>	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers)
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NIE</b>	National Intelligence Estimate
<b>NIMS</b>	National Incident Management System
<b>NRF</b>	National Response Framework
<b>PIJ</b>	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
<b>PKK</b>	Kurdistan Worker's Party
<b>SBIED</b>	Suicide Bomber Improvised Explosive Device
<b>SWAT</b>	Special Weapons and Tactics



<b>TNT</b>	Trinitrotoluene
<b>TSWG</b>	Technical Support Working Group
<b>USC</b>	United States Codification
<b>USS</b>	United States Ship
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction
<b>WTC</b>	World Trade Centers

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. THE THREAT OF SUICIDE BOMBERS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PREPARING FOR THE THREAT

Our nation faces a complex and dynamic threat from terrorism. Despite concerted worldwide efforts in the aftermath of 11 September which have disrupted terrorist plots and constrained al-Qaeda's ability to strike the homeland, the United States faces a persistent and evolving terrorist threat, primarily from violent Islamic terrorist groups and cells.<sup>1</sup>

According to the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on threats to the United States, the al-Qaeda terrorist network will likely leverage its contacts and capabilities in Iraq to mount an attack on United States soil. The report lays out a range of dangers from al-Qaeda to Lebanese Hezbollah to non-Muslim radical groups that pose a "persistent and evolving threat" to the country over the next three years.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the NIE assesses that along with explosive matter for the development of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), al-Qaeda will continue attempts to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material for their attacks.<sup>3</sup>

Terrorists worldwide have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness and ability to use explosives as weapons, and there is ample intelligence to support the conclusion that they will continue to use such devices to inflict harm. The threat of explosive attacks in the United States is of great concern considering terrorists' ability to make, obtain, and use explosives.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to realize that one of the more popular tactics in implementing weapons of mass destruction is the utilization of a suicide bomber. The suicide bomber is

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<sup>1</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security/Homeland Security Council October 2007* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 9.

<sup>2</sup> Katherine Shrader and Anne Flaherty, "Terror Threat Against the U.S. Said Serious," WashingtonPost.Com, July 17, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071700099...> [Accessed July 17, 2007], 1.

<sup>3</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 3.

<sup>4</sup> George W. Bush, Directive no. 19, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive-19: Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007).

the “ultimate smart bomb,” a human missile relentlessly homing in on the target, yet remaining flexible in timing and access. In this respect, the suicide bomber can change their plan of attack to adjust to the ease or difficulty of approach, the paucity or density of people or passersby near the target, and whether or not security personnel and other terrorism countermeasures are visible at or around the attack site.<sup>5</sup>

The Bush administration has coined the term “homicide bomber” to describe what formerly was called a “suicide bomber” in the media. This is appropriate in that the bomber’s goal is to kill and injure as many people as possible through the detonation of the explosives concealed on their person.<sup>6</sup> Each professional or academic scholar that has been referenced in this thesis has either referenced the suicide bomber as either a suicide or homicide bomber, or a terrorist. For the sake of consistency throughout this thesis all references to the above will be “suicide bomber.”

Suicide tactics have been adopted by a growing number of terrorist organizations around the world because the tactics are shocking, deadly, cost-effective, and very difficult to stop. Furthermore, there are only two requirements that an organization must be able to satisfy to enter the game: a willingness to kill and a willingness to die. Indeed, it is the ease and simplicity to suicide bombings which make them so appealing to terrorists.<sup>7</sup>

Islamic extremists are perfecting suicide bomber tactics, techniques, and procedures in Iraq. The end of the war could possibly shift the focus of suicide bomber attacks from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East to the United States. It is the policy of the United States to counter the threat of attacks aggressively by coordinating federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal government efforts and collaborating with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive attacks<sup>8</sup>. Simply stated, law enforcement and first

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<sup>5</sup> Bruce Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism, A Primer for American Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers* (RAND, 2004), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Governor’s Office of Emergency Services-Law Enforcement Branch, “Response to a Suicide/Homicide Bomber ‘Pre-Detonation’,” information bulletin, May 30, 2002, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “Grassroots Defenses, Community Leaders, Business, and Citizens Can Help Prevent Suicide Attacks,” *Rand Review* 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 20.

<sup>8</sup> Bush, Directive no. 19.

responders need to be prepared to prevent and respond to the situation. The final opportunity for prevention will reside with the ordinary cops on the beat who finds themselves confronting a suicide bomber.<sup>9</sup>

A logical conclusion resides with the development of a unified response plan to suicide bomber incidents. A framework of this nature would allow all first responder disciplines to respond using indistinguishable techniques. This plan, if developed, would require state agencies such as law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical services, public works, hazardous material, and emergency management disciplines to work cohesively with federal agencies to effectively mitigate or recover from a suicide bomber incident.

## **B. UTILIZATION OF SUICIDE BOMBER STRATEGY**

During the attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States encountered a suicide bombing campaign of profound proportions. These were the first successful suicide bombings in the United States; the terrorists piloting the aircraft were fully aware they were engaging in suicide missions.<sup>10</sup>

On this day, between 0755 hours and 0842 hours, four planes departed from East Coast airports. Divided among the planes were nineteen hijackers. There were fifteen Saudi Arabians, two Emirates, one Lebanese, and leading them all, an Egyptian, Muhammad Atta. American Airlines Flight 11 struck the north face of the north tower, World Trade Center (WTC) 1, hitting the ninety-fourth through ninety-eighth floors. The Boeing 767-200, which departed from Boston, was carrying ninety-two people and an estimated ten thousand gallons of jet fuel. Flight 11 contained five hijackers committed to a suicide bomber mission.

United Airlines Flight 175 struck the south face of the south tower, WTC 2, at 0902 hours; the impact came between the seventy-eighth and eighty-fourth floors. The aircraft, also a Boeing 767-200 departing from Boston, had sixty-five people and an estimated ten thousand gallons of jet fuel aboard. Flight 175 contained five hijackers committed to a suicide bomber mission.

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<sup>9</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 15.

<sup>10</sup> *An Overview of Suicide Bombers – Part 1 of 2* Vol. 7 (CA: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center, August 19, 2005, n.p.) 1.

The energy stored in the jet fuel from the two planes was the equivalent of 240 tons of dynamite. The energy release was extraordinary, easily surpassing the charts of comparison for all other terrorist attacks. In contrast, the 1996 suicide bomb used to destroy the United States military's Khobar Towers was the equivalent of two and a half tons of TNT. The energy released in the Khobar Tower's bombing was roughly one one-hundredth as powerful a blast as the two planes striking the WTC.

At 0940 hours, American Airlines Flight 77 struck the west side of the Pentagon. The Boeing 757, with sixty-five people aboard, had departed nearby Dulles Airport en route to Los Angeles before being taken over and redirected toward Washington D.C. The impact of the plane resulted in a hole five stories high and two hundred feet wide, killing 189 people. The flight contained five hijackers committed to a suicide bomber mission.

At 1010 hours, the fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh. The 757, carrying forty-five people, went down killing everyone aboard. The hijackers' target was reportedly the White House.<sup>11</sup>

In the attacks on 11 September, suicide bombers targeted a prominent public American icon and easily identified United States government facilities. Numerous United States government facilities abroad have also attracted suicide bombing endeavors in recent years. On 7 August 1998, just after 1030 hours, a bomb detonated at the American Embassy in the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam. Four minutes later, another bomb exploded at the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. For the terrorists, it was a triumph of management and just-in-time-production. No entity had ever staged a double truck bombing in which the targets were separated by hundreds of miles. Al-Qaeda did not kill as many Americans as anticipated: twelve Americans died in Nairobi and none died in Dar es Salaam. However, the group achieved the dramatic overall boost in productivity that it had sought, killing 213 in Kenya and 11 in Tanzania, and wounding roughly 5,000 in the two capitals.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York, NY: Random House, 2002), 33-36.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 26-30.

On 12 October 2000, while refueling and taking on supplies in Aden, Yemen, the USS Cole was damaged by a suicide boat attack. The inflatable boat held between 500 and 700 pounds of C4 explosives. Witnesses observed the two suicide bombers salute and then blow themselves up as they brought the boat alongside the Cole.<sup>13</sup> The bombing killed seventeen United States seamen and blasted a hole forty feet high and forty feet wide through the half-inch-thick steel of the ship's hull, which nearly resulted in the sinking of the vessel.<sup>14</sup>

Even before 11 September, suicide attacks had been contemplated or planned but never evolved to the stage of execution on United States soil. Timothy McVeigh considered a suicide bomb attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City before securing a plan that did not require suicide. Four years before 11 September, two Palestinians plotted a suicide bombing of the New York City subway. Their plan was foiled when an informant tipped off police. Of course, suicide attacks have long been conducted against American diplomatic and military targets abroad: from the 1983 bombings of the United States embassies, the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, to the current campaign of suicide attacks in Iraq.

The spread of suicide terrorism worldwide suggests that the United States will not remain immune from this threat. Trends in terrorism already point to suicide terrorism's rising worldwide popularity.<sup>15</sup> The years from 2001 to 2005 alone account for 78 percent of all the suicide terrorist incidents perpetrated between 1968 and 2005. The dominant force behind this trend is religion. It is worth noting that of the thirty-five terrorist organizations employing suicide tactics in 2005, 86 percent (thirty-one of thirty-five) were Islamic. This movement, moreover, has been responsible for 81 percent of all suicide attacks since 11 September 2001.<sup>16</sup>

As of 2005, more than 350 suicide attacks had taken place in at least twenty-four countries. The countries include the United Kingdom, Israel, Sri Lanka, Russia, Lebanon,

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<sup>13</sup> Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC), "Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents, Operations Level Course Guide," version 04.05, New Mexico Tech, n.d., 2-22.

<sup>14</sup> Benjamin and Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, 33.

<sup>15</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 1.

<sup>16</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 131.



Turkey, Italy, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, Argentina, Kenya, Tanzania, Croatia, Morocco, Singapore, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. By comparison, twenty years ago at the dawn of the modern era of religious terrorism, this was a phenomenon confined exclusively to two countries. Those countries were Lebanon and Kuwait.<sup>17</sup>

Toward the end of the 1980s, suicide terrorism began to spread beyond the Middle East. The first emergence was in Sri Lanka. However, as the 1990s unfolded, the tactic spread into India, Argentina, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania.<sup>18</sup> Terrorists have become increasingly attracted to suicide attacks because of their unique tactical advantage compared to those of more conventional terrorist operations.

Suicide attacks, as clearly demonstrated on 11 September, differ from other terrorist operations precisely because the perpetrator's own death is essential to the attack's success. The means of attack, moreover, can vary widely:

- Terrorist can turn aircraft into cruise missiles (as in the 11 September attacks) or boats into torpedoes (as in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole).
- Loading a car or truck with explosives can render it a bomb (as in the 1998 simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
- Even pedestrian individuals can become bombs by wearing a specially designed vest or belt or by carrying a backpack or small hand-held bag containing explosives, all connected to manual or remote-control detonators.<sup>19</sup>

Just as the means of suicide bombing attacks vary, so must the tactics and techniques utilized in responding to these attacks. Israel has seen this evolution in suicide bombings. When security forces adjust their tactics for preventing suicide terrorism, the terrorists adapt. Examples of this adaptation are suicide attackers dressing as Orthodox Jews, dressing as soldiers, utilizing female bombers, bombers attempting to blend in with their surroundings, and the use of innovative packaging (guitar case, book

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<sup>17</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 2.

bag, etc.). It is even conceivable for “copy-cats” to adapt the terrorist methods for use with motives completely dissimilar to the Middle Eastern bomber.<sup>20</sup> The United States military has also witnessed this evolution in Iraq. The early bombings were primarily aimed at United States soldiers, yet once force protection measures were implemented, bombers sought softer targets. If suicide attacks begin in this country, the nation should be prepared for a similar evolution.<sup>21</sup>

One of the most easily implemented and evolving changes that a terrorist organization can make is to change the appearance and packaging of suicide bomber improvised explosive devices (SBIED’s). Suicide Bomber IED’s will often appear natural in their surroundings; in many cases an IED will be contained or concealed in packaging to remain effective and facilitate delivery to its intended target. Packaging can consist of metals, plastics, paper, glass, wood or any combination of these materials. The packaging can enhance the destructive effect and/or disguise the true contents.<sup>22</sup>

Delivery of a SBIED is limited to the imagination, resources, knowledge, and experience of the bomber. The avoidance of stereotyping and traditional profiling is imperative. In some cases, an SBIED can not be taken to the target. In such cases, the target must be brought to the SBIED. Examples of this scenario include explosive devices detonated when a vehicle passes, or when a crowd moves to the device’s (bomber’s) location. Delivery systems are designed to “fit in” to the terrorist’s intended target location.<sup>23</sup>

The New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology instructs, in their Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents course, that suicide bombings can be sectioned into three categories determined by design, size, and packaging:

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<sup>20</sup> Governor’s Office of Emergency Services-Law Enforcement Branch, “Response to a Suicide/Homicide Bomber “Pre-Detonation”,” 2.

<sup>21</sup> EMRTC, “Prevention and Response,” 2-27.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 7-29.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 7-30.

- **Type I** – The suicide bomber activates an improvised IED carried in a bag, box, briefcase or other object. Typical device sizes range from 11 to 33 pounds, or 5 to 15 kilograms, including the explosive and any additional fragmentation material.
- **Type II** – The bomber activates an IED worn under their clothing. Most Palestinian and Tamil Tiger (LTTE) suicide bombers are individual borne devices, either Type I or II. Over 50% of all suicide bombings utilize the Type II device. Body bombs typically weigh from 1 to 22 pounds, or one-half to 10 kilograms.
- **Type III** – The bomber activates an IED concealed in a vehicle. Most of al- Qaeda suicide bombings are vehicle borne. A vehicle can be a plane, auto, ship or even a train.

In terms of explosive power, Type III incidents pose the most serious hazard. However, Type I and II incidents may pose the most significant security challenge because countermeasures are often more difficult to implement than countermeasures for Type III incidents.<sup>24</sup>

### C. NATIONAL STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF PLANNING

Minute-by-minute, the scope and scale of any incident can rapidly evolve, such as when a hurricane changes course or it becomes apparent that a terrorist bombing is actually one in a series of attacks in multiple cities. Responders at all levels must be able to anticipate the course of an incident and the associated requirements, then work accordingly with counterparts to surge or deescalate resources and capabilities as indicated.<sup>25</sup>

While the vast majority of incidents are effectively handled at the community level, some require additional support from nearby jurisdictions or the state. This may include support through mutual aid agreements with other states. In catastrophic or highly complex events, all who respond should provide assistance in an organized fashion within the existing response framework. It is important to have the framework for anticipating the needs and coordinating with partners in advance, as opposed to waiting

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<sup>24</sup> EMRTC, "Prevention and Response," 7-29.

<sup>25</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 36.

for a request. In many cases, resources and capabilities are provided from surrounding areas. The nation must work together to clarify the processes to request and provide assistance. Furthermore, ensuring the necessary awareness, training, and familiarization programs for responders to execute related plans and agreements is equally essential.<sup>26</sup>

The *National Response Framework (NRF)* is a guide for the nation in conducting all-hazards response. The *NRF* is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The guidance is intended to capture specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.<sup>27</sup> This decision making framework can facilitate important strategic planning for specific situations, such as suicide bombings.

The *NRF* is written especially for government executives, private sector and non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders, and emergency management practitioners. First, it is addressed to senior elected and appointed leaders, such as federal department or agency heads, state governors, mayors, tribal leaders, and city or county officials. These are the individuals with the statutory responsibility to provide for effective response. For the nation to be prepared for all hazards, the nation's leaders must have a baseline familiarity with the concepts and mechanics of the *NRF*.<sup>28</sup>

Effective response hinges upon well-trained leaders and responders who have invested in response preparedness, developed engaged partnerships, and are able to achieve shared objectives. The players' bench is constantly changing, but a concise, common playbook is needed by all.<sup>29</sup>

The *NRF* response doctrine defines basic roles, responsibilities, and operational concepts for response across all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector. The overarching objective of response activities centers upon saving lives and protecting

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<sup>26</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*.

<sup>27</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework January 2008* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office January 2008), i.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

property and the environment. Five key principles of operations define response actions in support of the nation's response mission. Taken together, these five principles of operation constitute the national response doctrine.

The response doctrine is comprised of five key principles: (1) engaged partnership, (2) tiered response, (3) scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities, (4) unity of effort through unified command, and (5) readiness to act.<sup>30</sup>

Leaders at all levels must communicate and actively support engaged partnerships by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities so that no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities at federal, state, tribal, and local levels allow for planning together in times of calm and responding together effectively in times of need. Engaged partnership includes ongoing communication of incident activity among all partners to the *NRF*, and shared situational awareness for a more rapid response. In particular, the potential for terrorist incidents requires a heightened state of readiness and nimble, practiced capabilities baked into the heart of preparedness and response planning.<sup>31</sup>

Engaged partnerships are essential to preparedness. Effective response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted well in advance of an incident. Preparedness involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident.<sup>32</sup>

By using a tiered response, incidents are managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities when needed. It is not necessary that each level be overwhelmed prior to requesting resources from a higher level. Incidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the local level. Many incidents require a unified response from local agencies, NGOs, and the private

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<sup>30</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework January 2008*, 8.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

sector. Some incidents require additional support from neighboring jurisdictions or the state. A small number require federal support. National response protocols recognize this reality and are structured to provide additional, tiered levels of support when there is a need for more resources or capabilities to support and sustain the response and initial recovery. All levels should be prepared to respond, anticipating resources that may be required.<sup>33</sup>

As incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, the response must adapt to meet the requirements. The number, type, and sources of resources must be able to expand rapidly to meet needs associated with a given incident. The *NRF*'s disciplined and coordinated process can provide for a rapid surge of resources from all levels of government, appropriately scaled to need. Execution must be flexible and adapted to fit each individual incident. For the duration of a response, the responders must remain nimble and adaptable to the evolution of the situation. Equally, the overall response should be flexible as it transitions from the response effort to recovery. The *NRF* is grounded in doctrine that demands a tested inventory of common organizational structures and capabilities that are scalable, flexible, and adaptable for diverse operations.<sup>34</sup>

A forward-leaning posture is imperative for incidents that have the potential to expand rapidly in size, scope, or complexity, and for no-notice incidents. Once response activities have begun, on-scene actions are based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) principles. To save lives, protect property and the environment, decisive action on scene is frequently required of responders. Although some risk may be unavoidable, first responders can effectively anticipate and manage risk through proper training and planning.<sup>35</sup>

An effective unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization. Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in

<sup>33</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework January 2008*, 10.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-12.

support of common objectives. Use of the Incident Command System (ICS) is an important element across multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incident management activities. It provides a structure to enable agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively on scene. As a team effort, unified command allows all agencies with jurisdictional authority and/or functional responsibility for the incident to provide joint support through mutually developed incident objectives and strategies established at the command level.<sup>36</sup>

#### **D. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH**

This thesis focuses on discovering the strategic relevance of developing a national framework for responding to suicide bomber incidents within the United States. The main claim of the research is that inconsistent localized responses to a potential suicide bomber pose an unmitigated risk to citizens and first responders. Specifically, this research will attempt to address the following three questions:

- How should current suicide bomber response plans be exercised and modified to mitigate risk for citizens and first responders?
- Strategically, how does responding to a suicide bomber incident differentiate from a response to other bombings or events in the current all-hazards approach?
- Does the gap between a typical bombing response and a suicide bomber response constitute unmitigated risk and therefore warrant the development of a separate suicide bomber response strategic plan?

An initial step in the research was to conduct a thorough literature review to analyze the strategic knowledge gained by countries experiencing suicide bomber incidents. The literature was further scrutinized to determine how this knowledge translated into the mitigation of risk for the citizens and first responders of the affected nation.

A second step of the research was the planning and execution of a suicide bomber full-scale exercise in accordance with the national standards contained in the Homeland

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<sup>36</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework January 2008*, 10-11.

Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). This endeavor would allow for the identification of gaps between documented response and recommended best practices for the situation.

A final step of the research was crafting a tentative solution through the drafting of the Unified Suicide Bomber Response Framework.

#### **E. TENTATIVE SOLUTION**

In keeping with the intent of the *NRF*, and in order to effectively respond to a suicide bomber incident, there should be a unified suicide bomber response framework that can be used by any law enforcement, emergency medical services or fire department in the nation when responding to a suicide bomber incident. The guide has the basic tactics, techniques, and procedures that all agencies should follow and train towards. This guide needs to be available to the above agencies as a template so each discipline can develop response plans unique to their jurisdictional needs, prior to suicide bombers striking again on the nation's homeland.



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## **II. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH**

### **A. THE CONCEPT OF PLANNING AND PREVENTION**

The threat posed by suicide bombers is already a reality for American law enforcement agencies and personnel. The threat seems likely to grow in scope and magnitude in the foreseeable future.<sup>37</sup> Islamic extremists are continually refining suicide bomber tactics, techniques and procedures in Iraq. Conclusion of the war in Iraq has the potential to shift the focus of suicide bomber attacks from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East to the United States. As the world watches suicide bombing evolve in the Middle East, experts in the field of counter-terrorism continue to predict the eventual emergence of the tactic in the United States. Law enforcement and first responders need to be prepared to prevent and respond to the situation. The final opportunity for prevention will reside with the ordinary cop on the beat who finds themselves confronting a suicide bomber.<sup>38</sup>

To successfully counter this method of destruction, a national multi-discipline response and recovery framework should be developed. This framework would allow all homeland security identified first responder disciplines to respond using indistinguishable techniques. The plan would require state and local agencies in the law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical services, public works, hazardous material, and emergency management disciplines to work cohesively with federal agencies to effectively mitigate or recover from a suicide bomber incident.

The framework would include strategic guidance on the identification of suspect suicide bombers, confrontation of suicide bombers, and the strategy of response once suicide bomber detonation has occurred. The framework would also emphasize the importance of the localized policy, procedural, and training initiatives that must be in

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<sup>37</sup> Joseph Steger, "Can U.S. Defeat the Suicide/Homicide-Bomber Threat?" *DomPrep Journal* II, no. 14 (November 2006): 12.

<sup>38</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 15.

place to achieve the preventive potential of the guidance.<sup>39</sup> Unfortunately, few United States law enforcement agencies have trained officers on tactics specifically designed to interdict and cope with suicide bombing tactics.<sup>40</sup>

An effective defense against suicide terrorism must be as nimble, flexible, and adaptive as are the terrorists' planning, reconnaissance, and attacks. Law enforcement can not rest on past accomplishments in the areas of plans, procedures, and policies. The discipline must keep abreast of historical, existing, emergent, and probable future terrorist targeting patterns and *modi operandi*.<sup>41</sup> Unfortunately, response procedures typically taught in law enforcement academies, colleges, and fire schools have not and do not teach how to respond to a suicide bomber incident.<sup>42</sup> The framework suggested by this thesis seeks to address this shortcoming. Now is the time, before suicide terrorism occurs in the United States on a further scale, to develop and implement plans, policies and procedures that will effectively reduce, if not preempt and deter, such attacks.

## **B. THE STRATEGY OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS**

Preparedness is inextricably intertwined with national security, counter-terrorism, and homeland security strategies. The nation has taken essential steps over the past five years through plans, policies, and guidelines to strengthen its ability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from the natural and man-made disasters that will occur.<sup>43</sup> However, the nation must go further and continue to build upon the foundation of national and homeland security established since 11 September to improve preparedness capabilities. The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the imperative to integrate and synchronize policies, strategies, and plans into a unified system for homeland security. This unifying system will greatly facilitate national preparedness.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 15.

<sup>40</sup> Steger, "Can U.S. Defeat the Suicide/Homicide-Bomber Threat?" 12.

<sup>41</sup> Hoffman, "Grassroots Defenses," 21.

<sup>42</sup> Robert Newnam (Director, Delaware Fire School), interview with author, Dover, DE, February 6, 2008.

<sup>43</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned February 2006* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office), 65.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 65-66.

As a nation, a shared vision or commitment to preparedness has yet to be developed. It is essential for the nation to contemplate what must be done to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the next catastrophe. In the absence of a shared vision that is acted upon by all levels of the nation and encompasses the full range of our preparedness and response capabilities, a truly transformational national state of preparedness can not be achieved.<sup>45</sup>

While the responsibility for national security rests with the federal government working with its international partners, the precepts of federalism make every level of government and region of the country both a contributor to, and responsible for, homeland security.<sup>46</sup>

While it is necessary for agencies at all levels of government to work cohesively to ensure the security of our nation, there are significant institutional and intergovernmental challenges to information and resource sharing, as well as operational cooperation. These barriers stem from a multitude of factors — different cultures, lack of communication between departments and agencies, and varying procedures and working patterns among departments and agencies. Equally problematic, there is uneven coordination in pre-incident planning among state and local governments. For example, the states and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security strategies, as have fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas. Although each state and territory certainly confronts unique challenges, without coordination this planning approach to response planning does not sufficiently acknowledge how adjoining communities and regions can and do support each other.<sup>47</sup>

There have been significant strides in making the United States and its allies more secure, yet safety is not assured. The nation has important challenges ahead as it wages a long-term battle not just against terrorists, but against the ideology that supports their agenda. Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. The networks are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and are less directed by a central command structure. Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor

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<sup>45</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, 66.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad. The terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the United States and its allies, partners, and other interests around the world.<sup>48</sup>

The United States government and its partners have thwarted numerous attacks from the terrorist networks. However, prevention is never perfect. Successful terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the world, ranging from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad. While the United States has substantially improved air, land, sea, and border security, the homeland is not immune from attack. The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry for those seeking to resurrect the victorious ages of the caliphates in the Middle East. Furthermore, their increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled the terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.<sup>49</sup> The tentacles of terrorism are ever present in modern society; therefore the United States can not risk the cost of an apathetic stance against an evolving enemy.

### **C. STRATEGY OF THE TERRORIST**

From the terrorists' point of view, al-Qaeda is implementing a rational strategic plan to achieve its publicly stated goals. The Western public remains largely unaware of these goals. The horrific acts carried out by terrorists capture the headlines, yet their stated strategic objectives remain buried in the footnotes of any discussion. Their goals are not very difficult to fathom. The strategy is reflected in various public declarations; particularly in the statements made by bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. The strategic goals of al-Qaeda have three focus elements:

- *Initial strategic focus:* to drive overt and covert United States forces from Muslim lands in the Near and Middle East. Covert American forces are entrenched in Saudi Arabia. The country houses the most important

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<sup>48</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *9/11 Five Years Later: Success and Challenges September 2006* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office), 1-3.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

Islamic holy places, including Mecca, the prime destination for millions of Muslim pilgrims from around the world each year.

- *Second strategic focus:* halting the unqualified U.S. military and political support for Israel.
- *Tertiary strategic focus:* end the United States support and manipulation of corrupt puppet regimes in Saudi Arabia and other dictatorships of the Near East, Middle East, and North Africa.<sup>50</sup>

Most suicide terrorism is undertaken as a strategic effort directed toward achieving particular political goals. It is not simply the product of irrational individuals or an expression of fanatical hatreds. The main purpose of suicide terrorism is to use the threat of punishment to coerce a target government to change policy. The tactic is especially valued when it can prompt democratic states to withdraw forces from territory which terrorists view as their homeland. The record of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001 exhibits tendencies in the timing, goals, and targets of attack that are consistent with this strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior. The first element is *timing*. Nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated or randomly timed incidents. The second element is the support of *nationalist goals*. Suicide terrorist campaigns are directed at gaining control of what the terrorists see as their national homeland territory, especially at ejecting foreign forces from that territory. The third element is *target selection*. All suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades have been aimed at democracies or countries exploring the viability of democracy, which make more suitable targets from the perspective of the terrorist.<sup>51</sup>

#### **D. A RECENT HISTORY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM**

The key to understanding suicide terrorism is not attempting to profile individual bombers. Insight resides in examining the strategic, practical, and ideological experiences of groups that have employed this mode of violence as an integral, or at least temporary, component of their overall operational agendas. Several such organizations exist, notably including Hamas (Palestine), Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

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<sup>50</sup> Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 5.

<sup>51</sup> Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 3.

(Palestine), LTTE (Sri Lanka), al-Qaeda (global), Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Kurdish Worker's Party (Turkey), the al-Jemaah al-Islamiyya network (Southeast Asia), and Chechen rebel entities (Russia). Four of the organizations are generally acknowledged to have shared a highly "intimate" relationship with suicide terrorism as a sustained tactic.

The organization known as Hezbollah not only hailed the modern advent of suicide terrorism, but also graphically demonstrated its remarkable coercive utility against both the United States and Israel. The organization known as Hamas has been at the forefront of Palestinian suicide terrorism for the past decade. The LTTE is widely credited with being at the cutting edge of suicide technology and "expertise." Al-Qaeda perpetrated the most destructive act of suicide terrorism to date and remains firmly committed to the ongoing use of the tactic in whatever manner possible.<sup>52</sup>

Al-Qaeda will likely continue to enhance its ability to attack the United States through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq. It is currently the group's most visible, capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack on United States soil. Moreover, although officials have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qaeda senior leadership, the group likely will intensify its efforts to place operatives in the United States. The nation must never lose sight of al-Qaeda's persistent desire for weapons of mass destruction, as the group continues to try to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to al-Qaeda, a host of other groups and individuals also use terror and violence against the innocent in pursuit of their objectives. These entities pose potential threats to the security of the United States. The group includes Lebanese Hezbollah, which has conducted anti-American attacks outside the United States and, prior to 11 September, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Peter Chalk and Bruce Hoffman, "The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism: Four Case Studies of Terrorist Movements," (government publication, not releasable to the general public, RAND Corporation, 2005): 8.

<sup>53</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 9.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

Since 11 September, convictions show that terrorists and their organizations are actively planning attacks domestically in the United States. Significant convictions include Zacharias Moussaoui for his role in helping al-Qaeda carry out the 11 September attacks, and the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempting to destroy American Airlines Flight 63. Other convictions and examples include:

- Hermant Lakhani, convicted in New Jersey and sentenced to forty-seven years in prison for attempting to sell an antiaircraft missile to a man he believed represented a terrorist group intent on shooting down a United States commercial airliner;
- Iyman Faris, convicted in Virginia of providing material support to al-Qaeda by surveying possible targets to attack in the United States, such as the Brooklyn Bridge, and reporting this information to al-Qaeda;
- Lynne Stewart, Mohammed Yousry, and Ahmed Abdel Sattar, convicted in New York on charges in connection with passing messages to the terrorist organization The Islamic Group from Sheik Abdel Rahman, The Group’s imprisoned leader;
- Sheik Mohammed Ali Hasan al Moayad and Mohammed Moshen Yahya Zayed, convicted in Brooklyn of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda and Hamas;
- Mohammed Junaid Babar, convicted in New York of providing material support to al-Qaeda;
- Five brothers, Ihasan, Hazim, Ghassan, Bayan and Basman Elashi, convicted in Dallas, Texas of conspiring to export proscribed computer equipment to state sponsors of terrorism;
- Ahmad Omar Abu Ali, convicted in Washington, D.C. for providing material support to terrorist organizations in connection with the May 2005 bombings in Saudi Arabia;
- Uzair Paracha, convicted in New York of identity document fraud and violating regulations issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by acting as a conduit for material support to al-Qaeda;



- Six United States citizens in Buffalo, New York pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and admitted to training in al-Qaeda-run camps in Afghanistan;
- Six defendants in Portland, Oregon pled guilty to charges relating to their attempt to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaeda against the United States and allied troops;<sup>55</sup>
- Jose Padilla, the Brooklyn-born convert to Islam who was once accused by the government of plotting a “dirty bomb” in the United States, was sentenced to seventeen years and four months in prison for his role in a conspiracy to help Islamic jihadist fighters abroad;<sup>56</sup>
- The federal government has charged five alleged Islamic radicals with plotting to kill United States soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Their goal was to figure out how to kill as many American soldiers as possible;<sup>57</sup>
- Federal authorities said a plot by a suspected Muslim terrorist cell to blow up John F. Kennedy International Airport, its fuel tanks and jet fuel artery could have caused “unthinkable” devastation. In an indictment charging four men, one of them is quoted as saying the foiled plot would “cause greater destruction than in the 11 September attacks,” destroying the airport, killing several thousand people and destroying parts of New York’s borough of Queens, where the pipeline runs underground.<sup>58</sup>

From the terrorist point of view, the United States population elects the President and the members of Congress who make important political decisions. Consequently, the United States population bears some responsibility for what al-Qaeda sees as United States military attacks against Muslim nations. Therefore, the United States population is seen as a legitimate military target in the war between al-Qaeda and the United States. By attacking civilian populations in the United States, the United Kingdom and other

<sup>55</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *9/11 Five Years Later: Success and Challenges*, 8.

<sup>56</sup> Kirk Semple, “Padilla Sentenced to 17 Years in Prison,” *New York Times*, January 22, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/us/22cnd-padilla.html> [Accessed February 13, 2008].

<sup>57</sup> Kevin Bohn and Kelli Arena “Official: Radicals wanted to create carnage at Fort Dix,” *CNN.com*, n.d., <http://cnn.usnews.printthis.clickability.com> [Accessed February 13, 2008].

<sup>58</sup> Pete Williams, “U.S.: ‘Unthinkable’ devastation prevented,” *The Associated Press*, June 3, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18999503> [Accessed February 13, 2008].

“occupying” countries, terrorists deem it possible to influence elections and policies.<sup>59</sup> By delivering the battle to the homeland of their stated enemy, al-Qaeda does maintain a measure of forward movement to their agenda.

#### **E. THE RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION**

Terrorist groups are setting a dangerous trend of using suicide bombers to destroy targets far away from their theaters of war. Many groups are likely to use suicide bombers to infiltrate target countries and conduct suicide attacks against Western leaders and critical infrastructure in the foreseeable future.<sup>60</sup> Before 11 September, the critical infrastructures in the United States were weakly protected against sabotage or terrorism. Most Americans were blissfully ignorant about the size of the nation’s vulnerability and about the ubiquity of rewarding targets for those who do not bear well wishes for the United States.<sup>61</sup> Likewise, a team of terrorists could enter the country through any of the 5,000 public airports, 361 seaports and hide among the 500 million persons crossing the United States borders every year.<sup>62</sup> Some authors hold that it is al-Qaeda’s strategy to “bleed America to bankruptcy.” Al-Qaeda has threatened to attack critical Western infrastructures, the “hinges” of the world economy as bin Laden calls them.<sup>63</sup>

Critical infrastructure is defined as “an infrastructure so vital that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national defense and national security.”<sup>64</sup> Today’s definition of critical infrastructure includes eleven sectors and five key assets. This definition emerged from an earlier definition that included only five sectors, and is likely to expand with the evolution of society. According to the national strategy, critical infrastructure and key assets encompass the following eleven sectors: agriculture and food, water, public health, emergency services, defense industrial base, telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking/finance, chemicals and hazardous

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<sup>59</sup> Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 5.

<sup>60</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, “Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat,” *Frontline World*, 2002, <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/srilanka/globalthreat.html> [Accessed February 29, 2008].

<sup>61</sup> Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and Energy Security: Targeting Oil and Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures,” in *Terrorism: What’s Coming, The Mutating Threat* (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007), 29.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ted G. Lewis, *Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 3.

materials, and postal/shipping. The five “key assets” are described as the national monuments and icons (Statue of Liberty, etc.), nuclear power plants, dams, government facilities (offices and governmental departments), and commercial key assets (major skyscrapers).<sup>65</sup>

For a more in-depth look at what entails a specific sector, a catalog of the “Energy” infrastructure objects and facilities that require protection entails 104 commercial nuclear power plants, 2,800 power plants, 300,000 oil and natural gas producing sites, 1,400 gas product terminals, 160,000 miles of crude oil transport, 2 million miles of pipelines, 80,000 dams, and 170,000 water systems.<sup>66</sup>

Critical infrastructure protection is defined as the strategies, policies, and preparedness needed to protect, prevent, and when necessary, respond to attacks on these sectors and key assets.<sup>67</sup> The suicide bomber campaign of 11 September was an attack on banking and finance, government facilities, and commercial key assets using the transportation sector. Therefore, two critical infrastructure sectors and key assets have already been attacked or involved in a major attack.<sup>68</sup>

The devastation of 11 September demonstrates how attacks on infrastructure can result in massive casualties, sizeable economic impact, political ramifications, and psychological damage, not to mention damage to the American psyche. These are collectively called “attacks on the American Way of Life.” Because of their potential to disrupt an entire society, critical infrastructure protection must be one pillar of the homeland security strategy.<sup>69</sup>

It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts based on six criteria. The first criterion examines if catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of weapons of mass destruction would occur. The second criterion contemplates the impairment of federal departments and agencies’ abilities to perform

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<sup>65</sup> Lewis, *Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security*, 6.

<sup>66</sup> Schmid. “Terrorism and Energy Security,” 29.

<sup>67</sup> Lewis, *Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security*, 3-4.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

essential missions, or to ensure the public's health and safety. A third criterion examines if the state and local government capacities to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services would be undermined. The fourth criterion contemplates if there would be damage to the private sector's capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and delivery of essential services. The fifth criterion seeks to determine if there would be a negative effect on the economy through the cascading disruption of other critical infrastructure and key resources. The final criterion poses the salient question to determine if the public's morale and confidence in our national economic and political institutions has been undermined.<sup>70</sup>

Homeland security, particularly in the context of critical infrastructure and key asset protection, is a shared responsibility that cannot be accomplished by the federal government alone. It requires coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; and concerned citizens across the country. The fifty states, four territories, and 87,000 local jurisdictions that comprise the United States have an important and unique role to play in the protection of our critical infrastructure and key assets.<sup>71</sup> The relevance of a national strategic framework for suicide bomber response is most keenly felt from this perspective. Inconsistency in the strategic framework's application creates weaknesses, which in turn creates opportunity for the application of the strategy of the suicide bomber.

#### **F. THE ROLE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

Adding to the concern about suicide attacks is their potential connection to increasingly available new technologies. Although so-called "weapons of mass destruction" were not used in the 11 September attacks, the destruction was nonetheless unquestionably "massive." The prospect of combining modern weapons technology (especially chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons) with an age-old willingness to die in the act of committing an attack could be unprecedentedly dangerous.<sup>72</sup> Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of terrorists are among

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<sup>70</sup> Lewis, *Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security*, 12.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>72</sup> Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," *Congressional Research Service Report to Congress* (CRS Order Code RL32058), <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/> [Accessed March 1, 2008].

the greatest threats to national security.<sup>73</sup> Terrorists have openly declared both their desire to develop and their intent to employ weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its partners, and its interests around the world.<sup>74</sup> The threat of a terrorist WMD attack has increased due to an evolution of terrorist groups into decentralized, ad hoc organizations which are harder to target and eliminate. Additionally, the new terrorist organizations have greater access to WMD materials and the technical expertise to achieve their weaponization.<sup>75</sup>

“Weapons of Mass Destruction” are carefully defined in Title 18, U.S.C. 2332a. They include explosive, incendiary, or poison gases, bombs, grenades, rockets having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, a missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, a mine or similar device. Also included are weapons which are designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors agents. Biological weapons involving a disease organism are included, as are weapons designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. <sup>76</sup> Clearly the effort on the part of the government has been to narrowly and specifically detail the types of weapons included under this title, noting their special or particular danger from more traditional terrorist threats.

Homemade explosives or improvised explosive devices (IED) are derived from ordinary and inexpensive materials that can be procured locally. Commercially available fertilizer can be used, as can more sophisticated military ordnance if it can be obtained, such as plastic explosives. Detonation requires only a simple electric charge, provided by a few 1.5-volt batteries activated by pressing a button or simple plastic plunger-type device, which can be purchased at hardware stores. Screws, nails, nuts and bolts, ball bearings, or metal shards provide the antipersonnel component of the weapon.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *9/11 Five Years Later: Success and Challenges*, 11.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *WMD Awareness Level Training, Student Manual AWR-160* (Office of State and Local Government, Coordination and Preparedness, National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, n.d., n.p.), 4.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>77</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 6.

There are six types of suicide IEDs. These are: the human-borne suicide IED, also known as the suicide bodysuit; the vehicle-borne suicide IED; the motorcycle-borne suicide IED; naval craft-borne suicide IED; scuba diver-borne IED; and the aerial-borne (microlight, glider, mini-helicopter) suicide IED. Each of the six categories has been used in South Asia and the Middle East.<sup>78</sup>

The suicide body suit has evolved to improve its concealment and is becoming increasingly small. Initially, the device was a square block of explosives worn in the chest and the belly area. Gradually the device evolved into a heart-shaped block of explosives placed just above the naval. As body searches for suicide devices are usually conducted around the abdomen, a group is also developing breast bombs.<sup>79</sup>

Most suicide body suits have limited electronics, making it difficult for security agencies to develop counter-technologies to detect the devices. A suicide body suit can be constructed from commercial items. With the exception of malleable plastic explosives and the detonator, the remaining components can be purchased from a tailor shop (stretch denim) and an auto shop (steel ball bearings, wires, batteries and switches). Furthermore, when a device is sophisticated it becomes difficult to operate and becomes challenging to fix when it fails to function. For these reasons, suicide devices will likely remain simple.<sup>80</sup>

In sum, terrorists are becoming increasingly effective by using suicide attacks, and the trend points to a catastrophic unconventional terrorist attack that could make the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington pale in comparison. The strategic response of the United States relies on overwhelming military force to crush evolving jihadist swarms, but this inflexible and maladaptive strategy only propagates leaner and meaner mutations of suicide networks and cells.<sup>81</sup>

The most promising way to contain suicide terrorism then is to reduce the terrorists' confidence in their ability to carry out attacks on the target society. States that

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<sup>78</sup> Gunaratna. "Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat."

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Scott Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2004): 70.

face persistent suicide terrorism should recognize that neither offensive military action nor concessions alone are likely to do much good and should invest significant resources in border defenses and other means of homeland security.<sup>82</sup> Now is the time, before suicide terrorism occurs in the United States on a further scale, to develop and implement plans, policies and procedures that will effectively reduce, if not preempt and deter, such attacks.

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<sup>82</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 2.

### III. SUICIDE BOMBER

#### A. THE RELIGIOUS FRAMEWORK

In the weeks immediately following the tragedy of 11 September, a genuine interest emerged in understanding the ‘whys’ of the event. *Why* ‘they’ hate us, *why* ‘they’ were prepared to kill themselves, *why* such a thing could happen.<sup>83</sup> Though it is impossible to offer any comprehensive survey of Islam and the roots of modern Islamic militancy in only a few thousand words, specific elements are of critical importance.<sup>84</sup> These elements include the sacrificial acts of jihad as it applies to the Shahada<sup>85</sup> and the deeply imbedded faith of the radical extremist.

Newer trends since the start of the millennium pose distinct challenges, making the threat posed by suicide bombers not only more prominent in recent years but also more frequently motivated by religion. From 2000 to 2003, more than 300 suicide attacks killed more than 5,300 people in seventeen countries and left additional thousands wounded. At least 70 percent of these attacks were religiously motivated, with more than 100 attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates acting in al-Qaeda’s name.<sup>86</sup>

“Suicide bomber” is a term, with derogatory overtones, coined in the West to represent what in Islam is known as a Fedayeen (this can have other non-suicide meanings related to resistance) or Shahid, a martyr. The intent of the bomber is not suicide. The intent of the bomber is to kill infidels in battle. Visiting death upon the infidels is not only permitted by Muhammad, but encouraged with liberal promises of heavenly reward.<sup>87</sup>

The religious and theological justification communicated and encouraged by Muslim clerical authorities has played an important role in framing popular attitudes

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<sup>83</sup> Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (New York, NY: I.B. Taurus, 2006), xxvii.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>85</sup> The Shahada, a testimony of faith, or the first pillar of Islamic faith is the Muslim declaration of oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad. Recitation of the Shahada is performed daily and to Muslims is the most important of the Five Pillars of Islam.

<sup>86</sup> Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” 69.

<sup>87</sup> The Religion of Peace, “Suicide Bombing (Martyrdom),” <http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/Quran/018-suicide-bombing.htm> [Accessed February 29, 2008].



toward suicide operations and encouraging followers to carry out acts of self-sacrifice on behalf of the Muslim community. Characteristic of this role was a sermon given by Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi on April 12, 2001, at the Gaza City mosque. The sheikh's sermon was broadcast live on Palestinian television and advised followers, "...anyone who does not attain martyrdom in these days should wake in the middle of the night and say, "My God, why have you deprived me of martyrdom for your sake, for the martyr lives next to Allah." He then called on Allah to "accept our martyrs in the highest heavens...and raise the flag of Jihad across the land."88

It is a mistake to see jihad as merely a tactic aimed at achieving a specific worldly goal. This point is critical in understanding why acts of spectacular terror, especially those involving the suicides of the attackers, occur. Fundamentally, acts of jihad are conceived as demonstrations of faith performed for God by an individual. The immediate local aims or enemies are largely irrelevant. Jihad is part of a cosmic struggle, and thus to expect an immediate result from the endeavor would be presumptuous and wrong. Though jihad will eventually result in victory, should Allah will it, the victory may be generations, centuries, even millennia into the future. It is the act that is important, not the results. Jihad is conceptualized as an eternal process of affirming faith that should be performed by all Muslims at all times.89

The sacrificial quality in jihad combines with another essential element of Islam, the Shahadah, the "testament" or the bearing witness, with a potency that is of critical importance for understanding what happened on 11 September.90

The Shahada is the first of the five 'pillars of Islam' which make a Muslim a Muslim. The call to prayer, the adhan, includes the lines 'ash-hadu an la illaha illallah, ash-hadu Mohammed ur rasulullah' which are translated as 'I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, I bear witness that Mohammed is His prophet.' The Shahada is both a statement of profound personal faith and a declaration to others, a 'bearing witness.'

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88 Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 158.

89 Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, 34-35.

90 Ibid.

Serving as a witness needs an audience other than God, who is after all omniscient. Jihad shares this demonstrative quality, particularly when combined with that ultimate affirmation of faith — martyrdom.<sup>91</sup>

The Arabic Qur'anic word for martyr or the martyred, *shahid*, also means witness. It comes from the same root as 'shahadah.' This is critical for understanding the world view and the motivations of contemporary Islamic militants. In the last paragraph of the final instructions Mohammed Atta gave the hijackers on the eve of the 11 September attack is the injunction to 'let [their] last words be "There is no god but God and Mohammed is His prophet."<sup>92</sup> The suicide bombers knew the witness to the testament they verbalized with the Shahadah and demonstrated at that moment with their martyrdom would be counted in the billions, courtesy of satellite television.

The suicide attack demonstrates faith and strength to the individuals the bomber, and his commanders, seek to motivate. The attack seeks to make it impossible to ignore what the martyr believes, and furthermore strongly suggests only something with inherent value, authenticity and power could provoke such an act. Concurrently, it suggests the 'cosmic struggle' is also a reality. Concluding this equation is the element of shame. A suicide attack, an incredible sacrifice carried out 'on their behalf,' presents a challenge to a spectator's own absence of faith or inaction.<sup>93</sup>

A suicide attack is designed to demonstrate faith is lacking on one side and exists on the other. Therefore it forces all witnesses aware of the martyr's action to conclude, regardless of the apparent imbalance of forces, when the most important quality is considered, which is faith, it is the suicide bomber who has it in greatest depth. It is faith that is necessary for victory in the long-term struggle. In an interview in September

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<sup>91</sup> Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*.

<sup>92</sup> Sincere recitation of this confession of faith before two Muslims is the sole requirement for those who wish to join the Muslim community. It represents acceptance not only of Allah and his prophet, but of the entirety of Islam. As one of the Pillars, the shahada must be recited correctly aloud with full understanding and internal assent at least once in every Muslim's lifetime. (Religion Facts, "Shahada: Confessions of Faith" <http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/practices/shahada-faith.htm> [Accessed March 2, 2008]).

<sup>93</sup> Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, 34-35.

2002, al-Zawahiri stated this explicitly, saying, “It is the love of death in the path of Allah that is the weapon that will annihilate this evil empire of America, by the permission of Allah.”

Theological arguments are regularly invoked by the organizations responsible for the attacks and by the community that approvingly supports the attacks. The Qur’an, however, expressly forbids suicide. It is considered as one of the “greatest wrong-doings” a Muslim can commit. This is according to Abu Ruqaiyah, an Islamic philosopher and author of a detailed treatise addressing religious legitimacy of suicide terrorism. Accordingly, a semantic distinction has been devised that differentiates suicide — the taking of one’s own life — from martyrdom, in which the perpetrator’s death is a requirement for the attack’s success and is thereby justified and accepted. Suicide terrorism therefore becomes the ultimate expression of selflessness and altruism.<sup>94</sup>

## **B. THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY**

Islamic extremism refers to the political philosophy that postures, in order to defend a carefully defined vision of Islam and protect pious Muslims around the world, that one must impose essentially a seventh century political structure over people of the Islamic world. Furthermore, this political structure must be implemented by violent jihad, or Holy War.<sup>95</sup>

Most Sunni Islamist extremists movements follow a conservative Islamic tradition known as Salafism. Salafism is rooted in the belief the Koran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions are the most legitimate sources of religious conduct and reasoning, and as such should be emulated and practiced in contemporary Islamic communities. Some contemporary Salafists believe violence is a legitimate means of reasserting control of the world’s Islamic community. Salafi Jihadists represent a small percentage of the overall Salafi population, but have proven very influential with al-Qaeda’s distorted interpretation of Salafi Islam attracting Muslims from around the world.<sup>96</sup> The vision of the jihadists is to restore the purity of Islam as it existed during the

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<sup>94</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 159.

<sup>95</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat* report, 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 2006, Report 106-615, 7.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

time of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7<sup>th</sup> century. This would serve as a counterbalance to the United States and the West. Bin Laden draws upon a long tradition of intolerance within a stream of Islam, which flows from Ibn Taymiyyah through Sayyid Qutb, and his ideology depicts America as the front of all evil, the “head of the snake.”<sup>97</sup>

Osama bin Laden’s message is taken from the Salafi Jihadist tradition which calls for a global Islamic state under the control of the Muslims and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. When al-Qaeda’s message is interpreted in light of an extremist’s intentions, such words are intended to polarize the Islamic world into two clearly delineated factions: one that is against the West and the other that is closely tied to the United States and its allies. Osama bin Laden has called for a war against the United States and the West to remove their presence from Muslim territories. He views this as the first step to restoring the Muslim Caliphate, ruled by one Caliph.<sup>98</sup>

### **C. THE PERSPECTIVE OF SUNNI AND SHIITE**

The differences between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects are rooted in disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, who died in 632 AD, and over the nature of political leadership in the Muslim community. The historic debate centered on whether to award leadership to a qualified and pious individual who would lead by following the customs of the Prophet, or to preserve the leadership exclusively through the Prophet’s bloodline. The question was settled initially when community leaders elected a close companion of the Prophet named Abu Bakr to become the first Caliph (Arabic for “successor”). Although most Muslims accepted this decision, some supported the candidacy of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, husband of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima. Ali had played a prominent role during the Prophet’s lifetime, but he lacked seniority within the Arabian tribal system and was bypassed as the immediate successor.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Stefan M. Aubrey, “Combating Al-Qaeda and the Jihadist Ideology,” (fellows paper, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, August 2005), <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/2004-05/aubrey.pdf> [Accessed March 2, 2008].

<sup>98</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat*, 8.

<sup>99</sup> Febe Armanios, “Islam: Sunnis and Shiites,” *Congressional Research Service Report to Congress* (CRS Order Code RS21745, February 23, 2004): 1.

This situation was unacceptable to some of Ali's followers who considered Abu Bakr and the two succeeding caliphs (Umar and Uthman) to be illegitimate. Ali's followers believed that the Prophet Muhammad himself had named Ali as successor and the status quo was in violation of divine order. A few of Ali's partisans orchestrated the murder of the third Caliph Uthman in 656 AD, and Ali was named Caliph. Ali, in turn, was assassinated in 661 AD, and his sons Hassan and Hussein died in battle against forces of the Sunni Caliph. Those who supported Ali's ascendancy became later known as "Shi'a," a word stemming from the term "shi'at Ali," meaning "supporters" or "helpers of Ali." There were others who respected and accepted the legitimacy of his caliphate but opposed political succession based on bloodline to the Prophet. This group constituted the majority of Muslims. They came to be known in time as "Sunni," meaning "followers of (the Prophet's) customs (sunna)." In theory, Sunnis believe the leader, an imam, of the Muslim community should be selected on the basis of communal consensus, on the existing political order, and on a leader's individual merits. This premise has been inconsistently practiced within the Sunni Muslim community throughout Islamic history.<sup>100</sup>

Osama bin Laden is a Sunni Muslim. <sup>101</sup>The majority of the world's Muslim population follows the Sunni branch of Islam, and approximately 10-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite branch. Shiite populations live in a number of countries, but they constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. There are also significant Shiite populations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets. However, their differences sometimes have served as the basis for religious intolerance, political infighting, and violent confrontations.<sup>102</sup>

Open source information has identified at least nineteen Sunni extremist organizations that both share al-Qaeda's ideology and have the capability to reach the

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<sup>100</sup> Armanios, "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites," 2.

<sup>101</sup> History News Network (HNN), "What is the Difference Between Sunni and Shiite Muslims—and Why Does It Matter?" <http://hnn.us/articles/934.html> [Accessed August 24, 2007].

<sup>102</sup> Armanios, "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites," 1.

United States and our interests overseas.<sup>103</sup> According to the U.S. military, which has been working on developing a “typical suicide bomber” profile, most attackers in Iraq are believed to be foreigners — many from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab States, but increasingly of late from North Africa as well. The bombers are mostly recruited from Sunni communities, smuggled into Iraq via Syria after receiving instruction and indoctrination, fitted into their explosives-filled vests, and dispatched to their death.<sup>104</sup>

Coalition success in the global war on terrorism has forced al-Qaeda’s core elements increasingly to reach out to other Sunni Islamist extremists groups for support. Historically, the “other” groups have focused their efforts against local targets. Yet, there is growing evidence these groups are more willing to work with bin Laden. Some of the groups have received training, weapons and funding from al-Qaeda. Others have received only ideological inspiration while remaining organizationally and operationally distinct.<sup>105</sup> To Osama bin Laden, the end of the reign of the caliphs in the 1920s was catastrophic, as he made clear in a videotape made after 11 September. On the tape, broadcast by Al-Jazeera on October 7, 2001, he proclaimed, “What America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted...Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than eighty years, of humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated.”<sup>106</sup> Although these groups pose less danger to the United States homeland than al-Qaeda’s core elements, they are increasingly a threat to the nation’s interests abroad. Such groups could reasonably seek an opportunity to attack the United States in the future. Even if Osama bin Laden is captured or killed tomorrow, Sunni extremist groups may seek to attack U.S. interests for decades to come.<sup>107</sup>

#### **D. ELEMENTS OF MOTIVATION**

In the terrorists’ society, there must reside a segment of the population which believes in violence or perceives alternative strategies have failed. Thusly, there needs to

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<sup>103</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat*, 14.

<sup>104</sup> Paul Serluco, “Suicide Bombers,” *Homeland Defense Journal* 5, no. 5 (May 2007): 16.

<sup>105</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat*, 14.

<sup>106</sup> HNN, “What is the Difference Between Sunni and Shiite Muslims—and Why Does It Matter?”

<sup>107</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat*, 14.

be an existing level of violence which has become institutionalized and assumes a ‘life of its own.’ The individuals who perpetrate suicide attacks have many social, cultural, religious, and material incentives. These include spiritual rewards in the afterlife, the guarantee of a place with God for the attackers’ families, the aura of celebrity, and even cash bonuses.<sup>108</sup>

In cost-benefit terms, suicide attacks are financially inexpensive. Monetary rewards for terrorist organizations, on the other hand, can be large. Suicide bombings frequently draw sympathy from sources distant from the location of the attacks, especially donors who are willing to enable others to die in the service of a cause. For example, following a supermarket bombing by an 18-year-old Palestinian girl, a Saudi telethon reportedly raised more than \$100 million for the Palestinians.<sup>109</sup>

From a group perspective, suicide attacks generate more publicity than other types of attacks. The fate of the bomber is part of the story, and the large number of victims ensures public attention. Sometimes the goal of an organization is simply to draw attention to itself and to its cause. Given the current state of ubiquitous media, suicide bombers are more likely to be noticed. Since the main effect of the violence is intended to be impressed upon an audience, the shocking nature of the attack is part of the calculation.<sup>110</sup>

From the perspective of the individual bomber, the act of “martyrdom” may offer an opportunity to impress an audience and be remembered, an act that may be a powerful incentive for individuals who perceive their lives as having little significance otherwise.<sup>111</sup> Although some have argued that suicide bombers are coerced, this is not borne out by the evidence. The individuals are in fact subject to intense group pressure to sacrifice for the greater good. Individuals most easily manipulated for such purposes also tend to be young and impressionable.<sup>112</sup> There is often a sense of desperation or almost

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<sup>108</sup> Mia Bloom, “Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror,” in *Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), 11-12.

<sup>109</sup> Cronin, “Terrorist and Suicide Attacks,” 10.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>112</sup> Bloom, “Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror,” 11-12.

inhuman determination on the part of the suicide attacker. The rituals in which the prospective bomber typically engages are designed to make it virtually impossible to withdraw from an attack without losing honor and a place in society. Sometimes prospective bombers are encouraged to lie down in graves to have the feeling of peace that they are told they will experience after death.<sup>113</sup>

Radical jihadist terrorist organizations have created a recruitment and support mechanism of compelling theological incentives to sustain their suicide bombing campaigns. These incentives, moreover, are designed to appeal both to the would-be bomber and to their family. While male recruits, for instance are promised the proverbial seventy-two virgins in paradise, the families of male and female bombers are induced to support — if not encourage — their relations' homicidal, self-destruction by the promise of an assured place for seventy relatives in heaven. In her book on female Palestinian suicide bombers, American journalist Barbara Victor recounts a conversation she had in January 2003 with Shiek 'Abu Shukheudm. The Shiek detailed for Victor the seven rewards according to Islamic tradition that are bestowed on the martyr for his act of self-sacrifice:

From the moment the first drop of blood is spilled, the martyr does not feel the pains of his injury, and is absolved of all bad deeds; he sees his seat in Paradise; he is saved from the torture of the grave; he is saved from the fear of the Day of Judgment; he marries seventy-two beautiful black-eyed women; he is an advocate for seventy of his relatives to reach Paradise; he earns the Crown of Glory, whose precious stone is better than all the world and everything in it.<sup>114</sup>

In point of fact, the Quran makes no such specific promises — whether about the seventy-two black-eyed virgins or seventy of the martyr's relatives will be admitted to heaven. Nonetheless, various Muslim clerics repeat and perpetuate these ethereal promises, which the martyrs and would-be martyrs readily accept. Parents and other family members doubtless also believe the ethereal promises of the clerics. Although saddened by the death of their relatives, the family takes comfort in their own assured ascension to heaven.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," 11.

<sup>114</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 8.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.



Some individuals appear driven by a sense of humiliation or injustice. Some argue, for example, that perceptions regarding the plight of the Palestinian people influence the willingness of young Egyptians, Saudis, Iraqis, and others to participate in suicide bombings. Others appear to be driven by the desire for personal revenge because they have suffered the loss of a loved one. Nicole Argo's interviews of failed suicide bombers in Israeli prisons elucidate the connection between loss and revenge: When asked why they became martyrs or *shahids*, her interviewees responded:

Pictures of dead kids had a major affect on me. Many were killed [right] before me, like my friend [whose body] I had to carry in my own arms...[A]fter the *istishhad* (martyrdom) of a friend of mine, and after the murder of a baby...These two cases made me think that human life is threatened every moment without good cause...without distinction between those [of us] who are soldiers, civilians, adults or kids...<sup>116</sup>

A longing for religious purity and/or a strong commitment to the welfare of the group may drive individuals to engage in suicide terror. Religious ideology or political culture can be crucial. Suicide attacks in some contexts inspire a self-perpetuating subculture of martyrdom. Children who grow up in such settings may be subtly indoctrinated into a culture glorifying ultimate sacrifice in the service of the cause against the enemy people or in the service of a cult like leader. Palestinian children as young as six (both male and female) report their wish to grow up and become *Istishhadis* — often not yet understanding the full impact of this declaration. Yet, by the age of 12 the youth are fully committed and deemed appreciative of what becoming a martyr entails.<sup>117</sup>

#### **E. THE TAMIL TIGER INFLUENCE**

The work of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) is often cited as a formative influence in the techniques of suicide bombing. Their endeavors in the 1980s and 1990s are the indicators of success harkened by others that sought to emulate their methods. The 1983 Marine barracks bombing led, at least indirectly, to the initiation of perhaps the most ruthless and bloody suicide campaign in modern history by the LTTE. Their first attack occurred in Sri Lanka in May 1987. The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran later claimed he was inspired by the 1983 attacks. They have since been responsible for more

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<sup>116</sup> Bloom, "Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror," 11-12.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 14.

than half of all suicide attacks carried out worldwide.<sup>118</sup> It is the only group to have killed two world leaders, the former prime minister of India, Rajiv Ghandi, and the President of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa, using male and female suicide bombers.<sup>119</sup>

The LTTE represent an ethnic independence movement, not a religious movement. The special groups of suicide bombers they train, the so-called Black Tigers, are a strategic force against the much larger and better equipped government forces. The motivation of the Black Tigers has always been to achieve an independent Tamil homeland. Their motivation is not based in religious zeal.<sup>120</sup>

The LTTE is fighting for an independent Tamil state in northeastern Sri Lanka. As the quality of targets chosen by the LTTE is high, it has a sophisticated training program that requires at least one year. As well as training the bomber, the LTTE research unit tests the effects of explosives on dogs and goats to ensure the attack is successful.<sup>121</sup>

#### **F. THE EVOLUTION OF FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS**

A common stereotype exploited by terrorists in order to magnify their cause is the perception women are gentle, submissive and nonviolent. On the one hand, despite the prejudices describing women as good wives and mothers, they are still capable of murder by engaging in suicide terror.<sup>122</sup>

Female suicide bombers are relatively new. The first known attack came in 1985 when a 16-year-old girl, Khyadali Sana, drove a truck into an Israeli Defense Force convoy and killed two soldiers. The first female LTTE bomber, Dhanu, successfully killed Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. The first female PKK suicide bombing in June 1996 may also be the first instance of an apparently pregnant bomber, who was responsible for killing six Turkish soldiers. The bomber's name remains unknown.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," 10.

<sup>119</sup> Gunaratna. "Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat."

<sup>120</sup> Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, 124.

<sup>121</sup> Gunaratna. "Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat."

<sup>122</sup> Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 142.

<sup>123</sup> Debra D. Zedalis, "Female Suicide Bombers," (Pennsylvania, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004): 2.

Even more concerning is the growing number of women offering themselves as suicide bombers. Chechen terrorists began using female suicide bombers in attacks on Russia in 2000. Up to 40 percent of the suicide bombings carried out by the LTTE in Sri Lanka and India involved women, and women of the PKK have carried out a number of attacks against Turkish Armed Forces.<sup>124</sup>

Suicide bombers have often been drawn from widows or bereaved siblings who wish to take vengeance for their loved one's violent death. There is an empirical regularity in Chechnya, Palestine and Sri Lanka wherein suicide bombers have lost a family member to the "unjust state" and feel their only meaningful response to express their outrage is to perpetrate an act of suicide terror. The loss of the relative might also signal to the insurgent organization this person is a potential recruit who is unlikely to change their mind at the last minute or defect from the cause.<sup>125</sup> The first *istish-hadiyat* (female martyr) in Israel, representing the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, was Wafa Idris, a paramedic who detonated a 22-pound body bomb filled with nails and metal objects in a shopping district. Wafa killed an 81-year-old man and injured more than 100 people. The first PIJ bomber was a 19-year-old student, Hiba Daraghmeh, who detonated a bomb in a shopping mall, killing three people. The second PIJ bomber, 29-year-old lawyer Handi Jaradat, strolled into a highly frequented restaurant in October 2003 and killed twenty-one Israeli and Arab men, women, and children.<sup>126</sup>

Widowhood may sever the woman from productive society and/or leave her with a sense of hopelessness, especially in traditional societies. The surviving family members of people tortured to death by the security services have also filled the ranks of suicide bomber volunteers, and human rights abuses by the state only serve to shore up the justifications for violence made by the most extreme organizations.<sup>127</sup> The first Russian "Black Widow" or *saliheen*, Hawa Barayev, acted on behalf of the Chechen rebels in June 2000 and killed twenty-seven Russian Special Forces soldiers.<sup>128</sup> There

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<sup>124</sup> Serluco, "Suicide Bombers," 12.

<sup>125</sup> Bloom, "Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror," 13.

<sup>126</sup> Zedalis, "Female Suicide Bombers," 2.

<sup>127</sup> Bloom, "Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror," 13.

<sup>128</sup> Zedalis, "Female Suicide Bombers," 2.

have been allegations that Tamil women raped by the Sinhalese security services and military at check points join the LTTE as the “Birds of Paradise” unit of female suicide bombers.<sup>129</sup>

A higher percentage of women have been featured in off-the-battlefield suicide operations, which requires infiltration, invisibility and deception. A woman staged the suicide operation that killed Rajiv Gandhi in India. Most suicide operations in Turkey are by women.<sup>130</sup> A female Hamas bomber, 22-year-old Reem al-Reyashi, on January 14, 2004, killed four Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint. Of particular note is that Reem was a mother who left behind a husband, a 3-year-old son, and a 1-year-old daughter.<sup>131</sup> For many reasons, women are the preferred choice of secular groups when it comes to infiltration and strike missions. First, women are less suspicious. Second, in the conservative societies of the Middle East and South Asia, there is a hesitation to body search a woman. Third, women can wear a suicide device beneath her clothes and appear pregnant.<sup>132</sup>

Moreover, the fact a woman attracts greater media attention is an asset, in and of itself, to the organization that sponsored her suicide mission. The organization and its particular cause or grievances will almost automatically enjoy greater exposure, which in large measure is an immediate aim of the bombing itself. In turn, morale and enthusiasm among the rank and file are heightened.<sup>133</sup> International security expert Yoram Schweitzer of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University states “the enlistment of women from Belgium, India, Iraq, Turkey and the West Bank territories for suicide attacks in 2006 indicates that their role continues and may, in fact, represent a growing phenomenon.”<sup>134</sup> A number of factors have led the FBI to warn that female suicide bombers could be deployed by al-Qaeda against the United States in the future.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Bloom, “Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror,” 13.

<sup>130</sup> Gunaratna. “Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat.”

<sup>131</sup> Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers,” 2.

<sup>132</sup> Gunaratna. “Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat.”

<sup>133</sup> Serluco, “Suicide Bombers,” 14.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>135</sup> Cronin, “Terrorist and Suicide Attacks,” 17.

## **G. CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS AS INDICATORS**

Suicide bombings have emerged as an intrinsic component of this new era of terrorism. Although not new, violent martyrdom had once been a prominent feature of Middle Eastern terrorism some 700 years before its dramatic reemergence in 1983. Both the scale and sophistication of this manifestation of terrorism have escalated markedly over the last few years.<sup>136</sup>

From the perspective of the individual attacker, the act of martyrdom in the pursuit of honor may offer an opportunity to impress an audience and be remembered. This symbolic act may be a powerful incentive for individuals who perceive their lives to have little significance otherwise. Jessica Stern has argued engaging in such activities affords a way out of a life of boredom, poverty, despair and likens becoming a suicide martyr to the Muslim version of “outward bound.”<sup>137</sup>

There are two kinds of individuals who become suicide bombers. The first are people produced by an organization under a subculture. The second are educated outsiders who flock to the organization to volunteer because of personal reasons. These two groups are often comprised of very different kinds of individuals with varying degrees of educational backgrounds, abilities and profiles.<sup>138</sup>

The stereotypical image of a suicide bomber is that of an irrational, homicidal fanatic or at least an individual who is acutely socially maladjusted. The individual is usually assumed to originate from a highly impoverished family context with minimal formal education. However, when one examines the background of martyrs, it is evident they do not readily fit in to this simplistic personification. As Scott Atran observes:

Recruits are generally well-adjusted in their families and liked by peers, and often more educated and economically better off than their surrounding population. Researchers Basel Saleh and Claude Berrebi independently find that the majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have college education (versus 15% of the population of comparable age) and that less than 15% come from poor families (although about a third of the population lives in poverty). DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] sources who have interrogated al-Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo note that Saudi-

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<sup>136</sup> Chalk and Hoffman, “The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism,” 5.

<sup>137</sup> Bloom, “Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror,” 13-14.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

born operatives, especially those in leadership positions, are often “educated above reasonable employment level, a surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families.”...The general pattern was captured in a Singapore Parliamentary report on prisoners from Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda ally [and widely believed to be behind the August 2003 suicide bombing of the U.S. owned Marriott Hotel in Jakarta]: “These men were not ignorant, destitute or disenfranchised. Like many of their counterparts in militant Islamic organizations in the region, they held normal, respectable jobs. Most detainees regarded religion as their most personal value.”<sup>139</sup>

Although only a tiny number of people become suicide terrorists, these individuals come from a broad cross section of lifestyles, and it may be impossible to concisely profile them in advance.<sup>140</sup> The 11 September bombers were from comfortable middle-to upper middle class families and were well educated. This is a movement not of poor, miserable people but of highly educated people who are using the image of poverty to make the movement more powerful.<sup>141</sup> The Palestinian suicide bomber of the 1980s may be different than the second generation Englishman of Pakistani descent that blew up a London bus in 2005. The female Chechen suicide bomber may be a “Black Widow” whose motivations differ from those of a male Egyptian expatriate living in Germany, training in Afghanistan, murdering thousands in the United States.<sup>142</sup>

When suicide terrorism first surfaced in the 1980s, it was largely confined to a handful of countries and was committed or perpetrated by no less than a half-dozen groups. Today, suicide terrorism has spread to an estimated twenty-five countries throughout the world. Virtually every continent, except perhaps Antarctica, has experienced a highly-credible threat if not a suicide attack. Currently thirty-five groups, six times the number from twenty years ago, are perpetrating suicide terrorist attacks.<sup>143</sup>

The fundamental characteristics of suicide bombings, and its strong attraction for the terrorist organizations behind it, are universal: suicide bombings are inexpensive and

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<sup>139</sup> Chalk and Hoffman, “The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism,” 6.

<sup>140</sup> Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 2.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Daniel B. Kennedy, “A Précis of Suicide Terrorism,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 3, no. 4 (2006): 2.

<sup>143</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “Suicide Terrorism: How Should the United States Combat This Growing Threat?” (panel discussion, Center for American Progress, August 25, 2005), 4.

effective. This method of attack probably cost no more than \$150 to mount, and requires no escape plan. The attacks are less complicated and compromising, and guarantee media coverage.<sup>144</sup> The success rate is high because the bomb is, in effect, a “smart bomb” that can modify the exact location and timing of the attack based on a real-time assessment of the target. A person wearing a bomb is far more dangerous and far more difficult to defend against than a timed device left to explode in a marketplace. This human weapons system can effect last-minute changes based on the ease of approach, the paucity or density of people, and the security measures in evidence.<sup>145</sup>

Recently, “lone wolves,” individuals acting on their own or with only an accomplice or two, have received notable attention. Timothy McVeigh, responsible for bombing the Murrah building in 1995, and Ramzi Yousef, who organized the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, are the two most prominent examples. The document most often associated with the “lone wolf” phenomenon is *Leaderless Resistance* by Louis Beam, a prominent figure in the Ku Klux Klan.<sup>146</sup> Beam makes clear the concept of “leaderless resistance” poses operational as well as political problems. To succeed, an individual will need to master a number of different skills. For example, he will need to perform reconnaissance, select a target, acquire resources, build bombs, maintain weapons, and perform a number of counterintelligence evaluations. In summation, an individual will need to carry out all the functions a terrorist organization does, but with a fraction of the human resources.<sup>147</sup>

In the last few years there has been a significant increase worldwide in the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by suicide bombers, whether on foot, in a vehicle, by air, or sea. What is more alarming is suicide bombers could be homegrown terrorists, born in the United States and living amongst the populace.<sup>148</sup> During an interview Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that the United States faces a

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<sup>144</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 2003): 1-2.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>146</sup> Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” *The Seditonist*, no. 12 (February 1992), <http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm> [Accessed March 17, 2008].

<sup>147</sup> *The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security* (Center for Homeland Defense and Security, SO 3210, n.d., n.p.).

<sup>148</sup> Hoffman, “Suicide Terrorism,” 4.

heightened threat of a terrorist attack “for the foreseeable future” but any attack will likely be home-grown. Chertoff described a home-grow attack as a single person or small group of people living in the United States who were “recruited” on the Internet and pledged their allegiance to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.<sup>149</sup> In London, Casablanca, Madrid, the Netherlands and elsewhere, homegrown terrorist cells comprised of second and third generation radicalized Muslims have proven difficult for authorities to track and preempt. Such homegrown cells have been able to train and prepare in secrecy, escaping detection even from the local community. Although the United States has not seen this phenomenon on the same scale as our European allies, the potential for America to face homegrown terrorism is very real.<sup>150</sup>

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a University of Maryland database, contains information on worldwide terror incidents since 1970. The database reports one of every seven terrorist attacks is carried out by a home-grown extremist. The July 2005 bombings in London support this trend, and may provide further insight into the future of terrorist activities. These terrorists were home-grown, born and reared in the United Kingdom. Although their ties to al-Qaeda remain unclear, the individuals were willing to conduct attacks to support al-Qaeda’s global jihad.<sup>151</sup>

As suicide terrorism evolves, more Western, female and prison converts to radical Islam, and second-generation citizens in non-Islamic nations, may choose to become suicide bombers.<sup>152</sup> The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States poses a threat of unknown magnitude to national security of the United States. With the world’s largest prison population of over two million people and highest incarceration rate of 701 of every 100,000, America faces what could be an enormous challenge. Every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist recruit. Former Attorney General

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<sup>149</sup> International Herald Tribune, “U.S. says home-grown attack poses biggest risk,” (December 12, 2007) <http://www.ihf.com/bin/> [Accessed December 13, 2007].

<sup>150</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat*, 7.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>152</sup> Kennedy, “A Précis of Suicide Terrorism,” 5.



Albert Gonzales stated that “the threat of homegrown terrorist cells — radicalized online, in prisons, and in other groups of socially isolated souls — may be as dangerous as groups like al-Qaeda, if not more so.”<sup>153</sup>

## **H. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES**

Although it was not the first such attack, many people date the initiation of a wave of contemporary suicide attacks to the October 1983 destruction of the United States Marine barracks in Beirut by a truck bomb. This was a watershed event, particularly for Americans. The explosion lifted the entire building from its foundation and caused it to implode. At almost precisely the same time, a similar truck bomb exploded at the nearby French peacekeeping compound. The 1983 Beirut attacks resulted in the withdrawal of United States and French forces from Lebanon. These withdrawals have subsequently been pointed to by al-Qaeda and other groups as important indicators suicide attacks can be extremely effective against Western democratic powers.<sup>154</sup>

The organization of suicide operations is extremely secretive. The success of the mission is dependent on a number of elements: a high level of secrecy, thorough reconnaissance, and thorough rehearsals. Secrecy enables the preservation of the element of surprise, critical for the success of most operations.<sup>155</sup>

Suicide bombings are not conducted alone. The terrorist organizations recruit bombers, conduct reconnaissance, prepare the explosive device, and identify the target. Each local cell has one or more individuals who function as “hubs.” Each hub is connected to numerous other individuals within the cell and, although he or she may be only marginally connected to figures within the national organization, he or she runs the local operations. Individuals recruited and dispatched as suicide bombers are not connected to the hub. For reasons of operational security, the suicide bombers operate on the periphery of the group.

The traditional concept of security is based on deterrence, where the terrorist is either killed or captured. The success of a suicide bomber operation is dependent on the

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<sup>153</sup> *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization* (Washington, D.C: The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, n.d.), i.

<sup>154</sup> Cronin, “Terrorist and Suicide Attacks,” 4.

<sup>155</sup> Gunaratna. “Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat.”

death of the bomber. The suicide bomber is not worried about capture, interrogation (including torture), trial, imprisonment and the accompanying humiliation.<sup>156</sup>

Furthermore, in suicide attacks there is no need to provide an escape route or to plan for the extraction of the bomber. The group does not have to concern itself with developing an escape plan, often the most difficult phase of an operation. Therefore, a suicide bomber could enter a high security zone and accomplish his/her mission without worrying about escape or evasion. The certain death of the attacker enables the group to undertake high quality operations while protecting the operational security of the organization and its cadres. As every prisoner has a point of breaking under psychological or physical pressure, the certain death of the bomber or bombers prevents the captor from extracting information.<sup>157</sup>

Although over 70 percent of terrorist attacks utilize explosives, suicide terrorists may also select biological, chemical, or incendiary weapons of mass destruction. <sup>158</sup> Equally important but often overlooked is the use of small-arms weapons. This tactic was illustrated in the brutal machine-gun and hand-grenade attack carried out by Egyptian Islamic militants on a group of Western tourists, killing eighteen, outside their Cairo hotel in April 1996.<sup>159</sup>

When suicide bombings first began in 1983 in Israel, the bombers were theoretically easier to spot. They tended to carry their bombs in nylon backpacks or duffel bags rather than in belts or vests concealed beneath their clothing as is the current practice.<sup>160</sup> In order to make an attack more lethal, terrorist often use nuts, bolts, screws, ball bearings, any metal shards or odd bits of broken machinery are packed together with homemade explosive and then strapped to the body of a terrorist dispatched unnoticed to any place where people gather.<sup>161</sup> Another recent innovation is the addition of chemical

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<sup>156</sup> Gunaratna, "Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat."

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 2.

<sup>159</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 87.

<sup>160</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 2.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

additives such as rat poison, which is an anticoagulant and makes it very difficult for rescue workers to stem the hemorrhaging of the injured victims.<sup>162</sup>

The motivations for suicide attacks are not so different in many ways from the motivations for other types of terrorism, including attention to a cause, personal notoriety, anger, revenge and retribution against a perceived injustice. A terrorist will use suicide attacks because the method generally results in a larger number of casualties on an average than other types of terrorist attacks. According to data from the RAND Corporation's chronology of international terrorism incidents, suicide attacks on average kill four times as many people as other terrorist acts.<sup>163</sup> Suicide attacks usually attract more publicity than other types of attacks and can be especially intimidating for the target population.

## **I. COMBATING THE METHODS OF ATTACK**

There is a perception that suicide attacks are unstoppable. The impression is perpetuated not only by the logistical challenges of detecting and repulsing the threat, but also by the impression the attacker is driven by a desperate determination.<sup>164</sup>

Nonetheless, there are both offensive and defensive measures which may reduce the number and/or severity of attacks. Among the offensive measures are vigorous intelligence collection, preemptive strikes against the organizations that orchestrate suicide attacks (especially their leaders), and efforts to reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit suicide candidates.<sup>165</sup>

Defensive measures against suicide attacks include preventing perpetrators from physically accessing the target. The goal is to make it significantly more difficult for an organization to achieve a successful attack, increasing the costs in relation to the benefits gained through the attacker's death. This includes the full range of measures in homeland defense, from physical barriers to security screening to strict border controls.

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<sup>162</sup> Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," 12.

<sup>163</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 2.

<sup>164</sup> Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," 6.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

Some also suggest decreasing the quantity or profile of potentially symbolic targets, by measures such as restricting unnecessary travel in dangerous areas abroad or controlling the availability of sensitive information on the Internet.<sup>166</sup>

Israel has extensive experience in dealing with terrorist organizations. The experience prompted the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and government to establish an array of measures to stop terrorist attacks and at least diminish the results of a successful attack. This entails the three principle parts of Israeli counter-terrorism tactics. These include defensive measures, offensive measures, and punitive measures.<sup>167</sup>

The goals of the *offensive measures* are to stop the materialization of planning in its early phase or thwart the training phase of a terrorist attack. *Defensive measures* are intended to disrupt the terrorist who are proceeding to a target. Lastly, *punitive measures* punish the perpetrators, the architects, and the supporters of the terrorist attacks.<sup>168</sup>

The Israeli Army, Air, and Naval Force constitute what is known as the IDF. The IDF is the main organization used to execute Israeli counter-terrorist actions. The IDF's doctrine is defensive at the strategic level, while the tactics it employs are offensive. Working with the IDF is the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and Shin Bet. The two agencies work to support the IDF by providing intelligence.<sup>169</sup>

The reduction of suicide bombers in Israel can be contributed to the deployment of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) personnel into the West Bank and its continuing presence in all the major Palestinian population centers that Israel regards as wellsprings of the suicide campaign. Their presence has involved aggressive military operations to pre-empt suicide bombings.<sup>170</sup> Once the Prime Minister makes a decision to target the

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<sup>166</sup> Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," 20.

<sup>167</sup> Jerry D. Smith, "The Effectiveness of Israel's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," (masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005), 27.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>170</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 6.

terrorist infrastructures, military leaders have an array of options at their disposal. The options include air barrages, ground invasions, naval raids, and surgically concise attacks against the head of terrorist organizations.<sup>171</sup>

Israeli defensive measures are barriers put in place to impede terrorists in their attempt to carry out attacks within Israel. The goal is to stop terrorists at the very beginning of an attack while they are still en-route. The Israeli's understand they cannot protect everything, they acknowledge the reality of limited resources. The most influential defensive measure put in place has been the security fence. The security fencing was designed to prevent suicide attacks from occurring on Israeli citizens.<sup>172</sup> The Gaza Strip is already surrounded by an electronic fence. This is the reason why suicide bombings rarely originate from the area. The security fence between Israel and the West Bank is an extended structure composed of barbed wire and electrical metal with a tall concrete wall hosting lookout towers and snipers.<sup>173</sup> In 2004, the security fence was cited by the IDF as being a key factor in the 45 percent drop in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks compared to 2003. A senior IDF officer attributed the improvement in fighting Palestinian terror to the security fence, highly improved human intelligence, and tighter cooperation between IDF, Police, and Shin Bet agents.<sup>174</sup>

In addition to the fence, curfews and other restrictions on the movement of residents has been imposed. At night the entire area is under curfew so it is difficult for terrorists to move about and hide without being noticed. This alone cannot be responsible for the success of the IDF's strategy. Continued success is absolutely dependent on regularly acquiring intelligence and rapidly disseminating it to operational units prepared to take appropriate action.<sup>175</sup>

In Israeli businesses there frequently exist armed guards quizzing patrons before they enter establishments. The guards inquire if the patrons are armed and pat down the individuals feeling for suicide bomber vests full of explosives. Establishments that can

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<sup>171</sup> Smith, "The Effectiveness of Israel's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," 30.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>175</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 6.

not afford a guard or are unwilling to pass the cost on to their customers simply keep their doors locked, responding to knocks with a quick glance through the glass and an instant judgment as to whether a person can be safely admitted.<sup>176</sup>

The punitive measures instituted by the IDF and the Israeli Supreme Court are considered illegal actions by the United Nations and the international community. Nevertheless, the Israelis consider these punitive actions as necessary methods aimed at discouraging future terrorists. In Israel, punitive measures are aimed at discouraging Israeli citizens from aiding and spurring terrorism.<sup>177</sup>

Within the Occupied Territories, there are laws established which guarantee that individuals involved in terrorist groups will receive the harshest penalties allowed for crimes against Israel. The Israeli punitive system within the West Bank and Gaza Strip permits the capture, imprisonment, and exile of terrorists. A common and recurring practice is for the Israeli Army to demolish or seal the houses of persons who have committed offences or who are suspected of having committed such offences. In particular, the homes of persons who have carried out suicide bombings within Israel, against settlers or soldiers are always demolished in the aftermath of such attacks.<sup>178</sup>

Up until February 2005, Israel continued this policy even though it is not as effective as other measures. A key reason the policy of demolishing homes is not effective is the fact that Hamas continues to pay people whose houses are destroyed. The financial assistance of Hamas is easily sufficient to rebuild a better and larger house. Other reasons why this policy is not effective reside in the fact it gives other terrorist incentives for attacks stimulated by vengeance. Finally, there is the resulting public relations disaster. When the rest of world sees an Israeli soldier razing a house with a family standing near-by crying hysterically, the justification behind the razing is lost on the viewing audience.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 1.

<sup>177</sup> Smith, "The Effectiveness of Israel's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," 38.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 40.

Experts in the field of counter-terrorism predict suicide tactics will eventually be used in the United States. Many of these experts believe a substantial terrorist infrastructure already exists in the United States.<sup>180</sup> The element of suicide itself helps increase the credibility of future attacks because it suggests that attackers cannot be deterred. The capture and conviction of Timothy McVeigh gave reason for some confidence that others with similar political views might be deterred. However, the deaths of the 11 September hijackers did not offer this hope. Americans would have to expect that future al-Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.<sup>181</sup>

An even more troubling phenomenon is the discovery of possible cells in the United States itself. In essence, the 11 September hijackers were infiltrators to the United States, taking advantage of permeable borders to plot their attacks. The arrests of alleged militants in Lackawanna, Seattle, Detroit, Chicago, Florida and Portland also indicate Islamic radicalism is appealing to individuals rooted in American communities. The FBI estimates several hundred militants linked to Al-Qaeda are currently in the United States.<sup>182</sup> In the event suicide attacks are deployed in the United States there are a few recommendations for reducing the threat. Currently these recommendations include understanding the terrorist's operational environment, developing strong, confidence-building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most likely to come, and mounting communications campaigns to eradicate support from these communities.<sup>183</sup>

Suicide terrorism is practiced because it has successfully forced troop withdrawals and other concessions in Lebanon, Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Spain.<sup>184</sup> Consider the score card prior to 11 September. In 1983, United States forces left Beirut after the successful attack on the Marine barracks. In 1984-1986, the United States made concessions to buy the freedom of hostages in Lebanon. In 1993, the United States withdrew its forces after the Black-Hawk-Down incident in Mogadishu. After the attack on the al-Khobar Towers in 1998, there was no obvious United States response.

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<sup>180</sup> Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 1.

<sup>181</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 5.

<sup>182</sup> Daniel Byman, "Scoring the War on Terrorism," *The National Interest* (summer 2003): 84.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

When embassies were bombed that same year in Kenya and Tanzania, the response consisted of ineffectual cruise-missile attacks. There was no visible response to the USS Cole incident in 2000. In due course came 11 September, which did spawn a massive and powerful response.<sup>185</sup> Given the complexities of terrorism itself, governmental responses to this problem must also be multi-faceted. Global, long-term efforts to modify the demographic, political, theological, and cultural wellsprings of terrorism and suicide terrorism must be undertaken. Prevention “at the source” entails disrupting staging areas in the several countries which choose to harbor terrorists. Prevention at the “end of the line” entails target-hardening of critical infrastructure targets. “Along the way” antiterrorism can be implemented by controlling the movements of people and weapons at national borders.<sup>186</sup>

If a suicide bomber can be stopped before reaching the target, many lives will be saved, not to mention possibly saving millions of dollars in critical resources. Unfortunately, most law enforcement agencies have not trained their officers on tactics specifically designed to respond to suicide bombing incidents. The development of a Suicide Bomber Response Plan has been left up to the individual agencies.

The late Professor Ehud Sprinzak, an Israeli scholar and one of the world’s foremost authorities on terrorism, had long argued: “Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped — but only if security authorities pay attention to their methods and motivations.” Israeli experience shows, despite the significant death toll suicide attacks inflict initially, it is possible to counter this threat effectively, through proper attention, focus, preparations, and training.<sup>187</sup> Training and detailed instruction are needed on how to identify the suspicious, tell-tale signs of a suicide bomber. The training must entail how to confront such a bomber or suspected bomber. Furthermore, in the event the bomber detonates his or her explosive device, the training must teach how to respond to a suicide attack and secure the site. Simple policy and procedures

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<sup>185</sup> Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, “Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism, A Component in the War on Al Qaeda,” (research paper prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, RAND Corporation. n.d.), 26, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2005/MR1619.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1619.pdf) [Accessed May 4, 2007].

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>187</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 14.



must be developed, clarified, adopted, and rehearsed in advance, so that, for example, an officer confronting a suicide bomber knows which actions he or she may take and which decisions he or she may make without first contacting a supervisor or special unit for instructions.<sup>188</sup>

Training in this respect, requires specific instruction in mental preparedness for unusual and unexpected circumstances. According to one knowledgeable source who has trained Israeli police in these techniques, this entails teaching police how to process information to produce the most desirable outcome. A positive assessment, this trainer continues, will lead to a positive psychological reaction. Doubts and hesitation will create fear and possibly paralysis — a negative psychological reaction. Simulations, for instance, have demonstrated that it is not the degree of fear and stress that adversely affects performance but the reaction to the fear and stress. The most positive outcome results from correctly assessing the situation, and this depends on the ability to detect new information from observation, separate what is useful from what is useless, and respond as quickly as possible. Attentiveness, alertness, concentration, and focus over extended periods are some of the mental skills police officers can be trained to further develop. The officer is trained to absorb information specific to the situation according to detailed criteria to produce appropriate reactions. The significance of the reactive behavior is focus, where thinking and doing become one action. In extreme situations, one cannot allow concentration to drift away to the contemplation thought of “what will happen if.” Every extraneous thought is an obstacle to the best possible reaction. For a positive reaction, it is necessary to focus on the moment. Most panicked reactions come from losing this focus and ceasing to concentrate. If one can stay ‘within the moment,’ there is usually sufficient room for proper reaction (email correspondence with Israeli police trainer, May 2004).<sup>189</sup>

A recent example of the success of this type of training was during a February 4, 2008 suicide bomber attack in Dimona, Israel. After the explosion, a doctor and nurse who were first on scene initially mistook a second, would-be bomber for a wounded victim at the site of the terrorist attack. The two began to treat a young man lying nearby,

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<sup>188</sup> Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 15.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 16.

inserting a breathing tube and preparing to insert an IV line. When the nurse opened the man's shirt she saw that he was wearing a bomb belt that hadn't detonated. They shouted out that there was a second terrorist and raced for cover, dragging a wounded woman to their point of shelter. Police arrived just after the nurse sounded the alarm the bomber was alive and dangerous. As the bomber reached for the detonator, he was shot by an officer. After an estimated two minutes, the bomber's hand once again reached toward the detonator. The officer fired several more shots from an estimated two-meter distance to ensure the second explosive belt was not detonated. After the incident the officer stated, "I acted according to what I learned," his police chief said that he did "exactly what he had to do."<sup>190</sup>

The most effective approach to countering suicide terrorism, according to Israeli police, is not by relying on highly trained elite, specialized units, but by instilling a counter suicide mindset in every officer on the street. "You can't count on special units as the only answer," one senior Israeli officer maintains. "Special units are not the answer for terror. It is in the amount of people who are aware — having versatile policemen or multi-professional police." In this respect, the Israeli police— traffic police, patrol units, detectives, auxiliary police, and private security guards — should be trained to be aware of terrorism. The "street policeman is...the most useful," this senior officer maintains, "because he is the policemen who will be in the right spot at the right time."<sup>191</sup>

Efforts to stop a suicide attack can result in a premature detonation of the explosive which kills the defenders and attacker. This can lead to increased wariness on the part of the police, who then may be more inclined to shoot otherwise innocent-looking civilians who could conceivably be carrying explosives. This is a particular problem if the suicide attackers are identifiable as members of a different race or

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<sup>190</sup> Rebecca Anna Stoil, "Hero officer: I did as I was taught," *The Jerusalem Post* <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1202064578650&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull> [Accessed February 22, 2008].

<sup>191</sup>Hoffman et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism*, 30.

ethnicity than the target population. The result can be deep polarization and a cycle of violence that may destabilize the target society and perpetuate the goals of the terrorist group.<sup>192</sup>

All indications point to the fact al-Qaeda is still actively perusing plans to mount an attack on United States soil. Because of the asymmetrical nature of terrorism warfare, perhaps the most effective tactic that can be deployed is the suicide bomber. As discussed earlier, suicide tactics are shocking, deadly, cost-effective, and very difficult to prevent. The war in Iraq and Afghanistan has afforded Islamic extremists an opportunity for perfecting suicide bomber tactics, techniques and procedures. The end of the war could possibly shift the concentration of suicide bomber attacks from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East to the United States.

As a nation, the United States has not developed a shared vision or commitment to preparedness. Although there have been significant strides in making the country and its allies more secure, safety is not assured. The nation has important challenges ahead as it wages a long-term battle not just against terrorists, but against the ideology that supports their agenda.

Many terrorists groups are likely to use suicide bombers to infiltrate target countries and conduct suicide attacks against critical infrastructure using weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists have openly declared both their desire to develop and intent to employ weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its partners, and its interests around the world.

While the vast majority of incidents are effectively handled at the community level, some require additional support from nearby jurisdictions or the state. To successfully counter this method of destruction, a national multi-discipline suicide bomber response framework should be developed. This framework would allow all Homeland Security identified First Responder disciplines to respond using indistinguishable techniques. The effort of many organizations to develop training and suicide bomber response procedures needs to be commended, but the approach has been fragmented. The following section brings together in a cohesive approach, an all

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<sup>192</sup> Cronin, "Terrorist and Suicide Attacks," 12.

encompassing framework for what the nation could do to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the next suicide bomber attack. This framework is based on subject matter expert's recommendations, professional organization training programs and writings from various academic scholars.

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## IV. THE PLAN

### A. STRATEGIC RELEVANCE

There is no more important element in results-oriented management than the effort of strategic planning. This effort is the starting point and foundation for defining what an organization seeks to accomplish, identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and then determine how well it will succeed in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving its objectives. Establishing clear goals, objectives, and milestones; setting performance goals; assessing performance against goals to set priorities; and monitoring the effectiveness of actions taken to achieve the designated performance goals are all part of the planning process. If executed in a thoughtful manner, strategic planning is not a static or occasional event. Strategic planning becomes the dynamic and inclusive process for shaping the future, and success, of an organization. Continuous strategic planning provides the foundation for the most important tasks an organization faces each day. The process also fosters informed communication between the organization and those affected by or interested in the organization's activities.<sup>193</sup>

“Ours is a nation that must manage risk. The threats we face — terrorism, disasters, and major emergencies — respect neither jurisdictional nor geographical boundaries. We cannot prepare for every eventuality; thus, we must strategically allocate and apply limited resources. We must adopt a common approach and establish a shared commitment among federal, state, and local governments in our efforts to strengthen the preparedness of the United States. Only through such an approach can we build effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, and achieve the greatest return on our national investment in homeland security.”<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> William O. Jenkins, Jr., “Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National Capital Region,” United States Government Accountability Office (GAO-06-559T), 17, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06559t.pdf> [Accessed March 8, 2008].

<sup>194</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy: Guidance on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal* (Washington, D.C., July 22, 2005), 2.

Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) are developed at the federal, state, and local levels to provide a uniform response to all hazards a community may face. Emergency Operations Plans written after October 2005 must be consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system is mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System. According to HSPD-5:

This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach to Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.<sup>195</sup>

First responders such as fire service, law enforcement, and emergency medical services have been trained to respond to incidents traditionally requiring the disciplines to extinguish fires, apprehend law breakers, and save lives. When first responders implement traditional procedures in response to suicide bomber incidents, these actions may cause unnecessary damage or death. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), which represents the heads of police departments in the United States and abroad, has developed training guides on proper procedures for responding to a suicide bomber incident. Traditionally, a police officer is trained to fire at center mass first. In a suicide bomber response the tactic is inappropriate for two reasons. First, it may only wound the bomber, and a wounded bomber may still detonate the device. Second, if a round hits the explosive device, it may detonate. The IACP training guides state if lethal force is justified or authorized, aim for the head.

Development of a suicide bomber response plan increases first responders' ability to prevent, respond, and recover in a positive manner to a suicide bomber incident. Incorporating a few minor exceptions to existing standard operating procedures will not achieve the objective. Response to a suicide bomber incident requires law enforcement to develop a totally new incident specific plan. The new plan is based on identifying specialized response procedures, increasing officers' suicide bomber specific knowledge base, and exercising recently acquired skills.

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<sup>195</sup> Emergency Management Institute, *ICS-200: ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents, Student Manual* (IS200, September 2005), 3-23.

All jurisdictions are different and have unique elements specific to their State, counties, or cities. Therefore, one plan across the United States does not offer a realistic solution. A more practical solution is the development of a framework specifically to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the next suicide bomber attack. A framework that identifies the general elements required for such a response is highly beneficial. This framework at a minimum includes agency responsibilities for responding to a suicide bomber incident, outlines the basic steps needed, and provides appropriate guidance to handle the situation.

A suicide bomber emergency operations *plan* developed from the recommendations provided in the suicide bomber response *framework* is a better safeguard of first responders'. Furthermore, the lives of a significant number of innocent bystanders can be saved that may otherwise fall victim to the attacker.

## **B. EVOLVING THE RELEVANT LITERATURE**

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has released two Training Keys, #581 and #582. The Training Keys are titled *Suicide (Homicide) Bombers: Part I and Part II*, respectively. Training Key #581 addresses profiles of suicide bombers and common beliefs behind committing a terrorist act. By profiling the suicide bomber, law enforcement personnel can better understand the types of actions associated with suicide bombers and will be better prepared to prevent attacks.<sup>196</sup> Training Key #582 explains how police and other first responders should react to such incidents.<sup>197</sup>

Through this thesis research, the IACP guides have been combined into one document with the most pertinent information as the foundation of the new document. Using readings from other suicide bomber response documents detailed in this section,<sup>198</sup> the essential IACP training guide information was expanded and an all encompassing

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<sup>196</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Training Key #581* (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005), 1.

<sup>197</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Training Key #582* (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005), 1.

<sup>198</sup> The Incident Response to Terrorist Bombing and the Prevention and Response to Suicide Bomber Incidents courses at New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; the Suicide Bomber Mitigation Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; the Homeland Defense Journals Managing the Threat of Suicide Bombers and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); and the Israeli Experience symposium offered by Institute of Terrorism Research and Response.



new response guide produced. The new guiding framework is detailed in its response procedures so it can be used by law enforcement agencies to develop specific suicide bomber response plans. The document contains a response element and a recovery element. The response element is comprised of pre-detonation procedures. The recovery element is comprised of post-detonation procedures. Reality may well reveal an instantaneous move from response mode to recovery mode.

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, engaged partnerships are essential to preparedness. Effective response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted well in advance of an incident. The *National Response Framework* emphasizes preparedness, which involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident.<sup>199</sup>

Other law enforcement organizations have contributed to the preparedness efforts for a United States suicide bomber incident. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has developed a Training Support Package designed to give the tools necessary to present training to law enforcement officers and other emergency personnel on how to respond to threatened or actual suicide attacks.<sup>200</sup> The Los Angeles Police Department Bomb Squad has developed tactics, techniques and procedures that may be utilized to identify, detain, apprehend or stop suicide bombers or suspected bombers on foot, in vehicles, or inside a structure.<sup>201</sup> Additionally, in November 2002, the Philadelphia Bomb Disposal Unit members attended training in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israel relative to suicide bombings and the overall construction of explosive systems utilized during these attacks. Upon return, the team drafted a brief that focuses on identifying explosive systems and provides information which may offer technical consideration during an actual incident.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> Office of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 8.

<sup>200</sup> Technical Support Working Group, "Preparation for the Suicide/Homicide Bomber," Training Support Package, n.p. n.d.

<sup>201</sup> Los Angeles Police Department, *Homicide Bomber-Vehicles & Pedestrians Tactics-Techniques-Procedures*, n.p. n.d.

<sup>202</sup> Philadelphia Police Department, Bomb Disposal Unit, *Homicide/Suicide Bombers, Personal Martyrdom Operations Utilizing Human Carriers* (n.p., January 2003), 1.

These proactive organizations have developed internal training guides or programs to help their agencies develop programs for countering suicide bombers. Each plan has merit and contains valuable information. However, none of the reviewed plans are all-inclusive. This reality is indicative of the need for an all encompassing framework available for responding to a suicide bomber incident. The framework should be universally available so every law enforcement agency can use it to develop its own particular response plan.

Suicide bomber response plans have been written for less than a handful of cities. No response plan exists for an entire state. Agencies have approached the development of their plans from a local perspective, not from a regional, state, or national perspective. Although the plans have been written, none have been tested in a full-scale exercise. Therefore the effectiveness has not been validated.

### **C. STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK**

The benefit of a universally accepted approach entails allowing local agencies to jointly train and exercise utilizing the same basic plan. Cooperation between different organizations is imperative during an event of this significance. The well-designed and realistic exercise becomes a valuable tool for informing policy makers of their preparedness status and relationship to broader strategic goals for homeland security throughout the nation. Exercises play an instrumental role in preparing the nation to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other public emergencies. In addition to providing homeland security officials the opportunity to practice critical prevention, protection, response and recovery functions, exercises are a forum for evaluating the adequacy of existing capabilities plans, policies and procedures. Exercises, and their lessons learned, allow the nation to more effectively target investments to continue to improve the broader cycle of preparedness including planning, training, and equipping the emergency response community.<sup>203</sup>

In addition, exercises allow Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) to be reviewed, negotiated, and signed based on relevant and critical information available to

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<sup>203</sup> Dennis Schrader, Deputy Administrator, National Preparedness Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, statement before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communication, Preparedness, and Response (Committee on Homeland Security U.S. House of Representatives, October 3, 2007, Washington, D.C.), 2.

leadership. With the reality of overlapping and abutting response jurisdictions throughout the country, it is imperative for agencies to train and exercise on the same basic plan to alleviate elements of confusion. Given the complexity and lethality of a suicide bomber response, collaboration is an especially critical tenet for all responding disciplines.

Until suicide bombings materialize in the United States, responding to the incident will be speculation. Those who study and analyze terrorist behavior should attempt to apply what has been successful in other parts of the world to predicted United States scenarios. The intent for the Suicide Bomber Response Framework attached to the thesis is to create a living document. For the document to remain relevant, it must undergo continual revision and improvement based on individual situations and lessons learned. When the attacks are executed, they can be analyzed and the results applied to this framework or any plan already developed. Until such time, the nation must artificially prepare with the most realistic methods to ensure the responder community is as prepared as possible.

The primary target audience for the thesis, and more specifically the Suicide Bomber Response Framework, includes every law enforcement agency in the United States. This cadre of professionals includes federal, state, local, tribal and private security agencies. The manner in which an agency responds will be the difference in a successful intervention or the loss of many innocent lives. The secondary audience will be the fire and emergency medical services tasked to respond to a post detonation event. They too should have established procedures on how to respond to a suicide bomber incident versus a typical response. Collaboration between the two primary responder communities is imperative. Each discipline must know how other plans to respond when the event becomes a reality.

## V EXERCISE METHODOLOGY

### A. METHODOLOGY

Because the suicide bomber tactic is growing in use and effectiveness around the world, it was decided by the Training and Exercise staff at the Delaware Emergency Management Agency to develop a Suicide Bomber Awareness level training course. To accomplish this task, various documents and training packages on the prevention and response to suicide bomber attacks were collected from a variety of sources. The collected materials were developed by subject matter experts from the IAPC, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the Suicide Bomber Mitigation Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, *Homeland Defense Journal's Managing the Threat of Suicide Bombers and Improvised Explosive Devices*, the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response's Israeli Experience Symposium, and various documents from academic scholars.

The recommended response and recovery procedures obtained from these sources were compiled to create an all-encompassing framework. The framework was presented to the State of Delaware's Homeland Security Training and Exercise Committee for review. The committee is composed of representatives from each homeland security identified discipline to include law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical services, emergency management, hazardous material, public works, governmental administrative, public safety communications, health care, and public health. After receiving the unanimous support of the Training and Exercise Committee, a Suicide Bomber Awareness course was developed by the Delaware Emergency Management Agency based on the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.

To further expand on the need to be prepared for this type of an attack, a full-scale exercise was then developed with the scenario being a terrorist cell in the Mid-Atlantic region targeting dignitaries departing from an airport in Delaware. A full-scale exercise is operations-based and used to validate the plans, policies, agreements, and procedures

solidified in discussion-based exercises. Operations-based exercises can clarify roles and responsibilities, identify gaps in resources needed to implement plans and procedures, and improve individual and team performances.<sup>204</sup>

The full-scale exercise simulates reality by presenting complex and realistic problems involving operations in multiple functional areas that require critical thinking, rapid problem solving, and effective responses by trained personnel in a highly stressful environment. In reality, for an operational exercise to be successful, an After Action Report with an Improvement Plan must be composed. The participating agencies need to make the improvements or changes to their operating policies or the same mistakes are probable on subsequent exercises or in an actual response.<sup>205</sup>

None of the agencies participating in the exercise had developed suicide bomber response plans. Therefore it would not be reasonable to evaluate them according to the Suicide Bomber Response Framework. To accommodate this reality, two sets of evaluators were used at the exercise. The first team of evaluators reviewed the first responders based on the typical response protocol to an incident of this magnitude according to the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Guides. The second team of evaluators conducted their review based on the Suicide Bomber Response Framework and its uniquely designed Exercise Evaluation Guides. Only the first team of evaluators was revealed to the participants during the exercise play. After the exercise was completed the results from each evaluation team were reviewed to determine if a significant difference existed in responding under a typical first responder protocol versus what is recommended by subject matter experts in the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.

## **B. REQUIREMENTS OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM**

Participants were evaluated using the federal Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) exercise evaluation methodology. The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program is a capabilities- and performance-based exercise

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<sup>204</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Volume I: Overview and Doctrine* (Washington, D.C., May 2004), 11.

<sup>205</sup>Ibid.

program that provides a standardized policy, methodology, and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 and the National Preparedness Goal, HSEEP uses a capabilities-based approach to individual exercises and exercise program management. In the spirit of the National Incident Management System, HSEEP promulgates standardized policies and terminology usable by officials and emergency responders at all levels of government. The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program is accepted as the standardized policy and methodology for the execution of the National Exercise Program. The National Exercise Program is the nation's overarching exercise program formulated by the National Security Council/Homeland Security Council and executed by the Federal Interagency Coalition. All interagency partners have adopted the HSEEP as the methodology for all exercises that will be conducted as part of the National Exercise Program.<sup>206</sup>

Exercises allow personnel, from first responders to senior officials, to validate training and practice strategic and tactical prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-reduced environment. Exercises are the primary tool for assessing preparedness and identifying areas for improvement, while demonstrating community resolve to prepare for major incidents. Exercises aim to help entities within the community gain objective assessments of current capabilities so gaps, deficiencies, and vulnerabilities are addressed prior to a real incident.

Well-designed and well-executed exercises are the most effective means of:

- Assessing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, assumptions, and interagency agreements;
- Clarifying roles and responsibilities;
- Improving interagency coordination and communications;
- Identifying gaps in resources;
- Measuring performance; and
- Identifying opportunities for improvement.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> DHS, *HSEEP, Volume I*, 1.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

According to the HSEEP methodology, exercise evaluation incorporates three distinct level of analysis: task-level analysis, activity-level analysis, and capability-level analysis.

### **1. Task-Level Analysis**

Tasks are specific, discrete actions individuals or groups must successfully perform or address during an operations based exercise. Task-level analysis assists representatives of exercising entities in analyzing shortcomings or strengths related to individual actions. The analysis can also help entities target plans, equipment, and training resources to improve specific task performance.

### **2. Activity-Level Analysis**

Activities are groups of similar tasks, that when carried out according to plans and procedures, allow an entity to demonstrate an associated capability from the Universal Task List and Target Capabilities List.

The Universal Task List identifies the tasks that need to be performed by all levels of government and a variety of disciplines to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, natural disaster, and other emergencies. The Target Capabilities List describes thirty-six capabilities required to perform almost two hundred critical tasks. Critical tasks are defined as those tasks that must be performed during a major event to prevent occurrence, reduce loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate significant property damage, are essential to the success of a homeland security mission, and require coordination among a combination of federal, state, local and tribal entities.<sup>208</sup>

When conducting activity-level analysis, exercise evaluators seek to determine whether all activities have been performed successfully and in accordance with plans, policies, and agreements. Through the analysis, exercise evaluators gain valuable insight into broad thematic successes or challenges in performing related tasks. Awareness of such themes is essential to improving the performance of individual tasks, and thus demonstrating the associated capability. Such analysis is also vital in assessing the

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<sup>208</sup> Bush, Directive no. 8, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness," (Department of Homeland Security/State and Local Government Coordination DHS/SLGCP, n.d.), [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/Website\\_Stakeholder\\_List.pdf](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/Website_Stakeholder_List.pdf) [Accessed October 22, 2007].

effectiveness with which individuals worked together at the discipline or organizational level, and how well team members communicated across organizational boundaries during an exercise.

### **3. Capability-Level Analysis**

Capabilities are combinations of elements that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome. Capability-level analysis involves assessing an entity's ability to demonstrate its priority capabilities necessary to successfully prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from the threat or hazard simulated in the exercise scenario. When conducting capability-level analysis, exercise evaluators examine whether an entity's performance of specific tasks and activities was sufficient to demonstrate the desired capability outcome. Capability-level analysis is designed to assist managers and executives in developing operating plans and budgets, communication with political officials, setting long-range training and planning goals, and developing interagency and/or inter jurisdictional agreements.<sup>209</sup>

## **C. THE EXERCISE DESIGN**

On July 28, 2007, a full-scale exercise was performed at New Castle Airport in New Castle, Delaware. The exercise focused on the prevention and response to a suicide bomber cell targeting dignitaries departing the local airfield. The exercise examined the effectiveness of existing State and local jurisdiction plans, procedures, policies, and the resulting coordination in response to a potential suicide bomber attack. Critical issues examined include information sharing, coordination, communication, and resource allocation among departments and agencies involved in a response to a terrorist attack at the airport.

The exercise began with pre-incident intelligence on a terrorist group operating in the Mid-Atlantic region 48 hours prior to the exercise start time. Another more targeted State specific intelligence report was released 24 hours prior to the exercise. Two hours prior to exercise start time the intelligence evolved to a level that identified New Castle Airport and specific targets, tactics, and personnel who would conduct the attack. All intelligence feeds were pre-screened by the FBI for authenticity. The Fusion Center was

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<sup>209</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)*, Volume III: *Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Planning* (Washington, D.C., February 2007), 1-2.



tested on their procedures for disseminating critical information to law enforcement agencies, fire service, emergency management and EMS. Three aircraft were pre-positioned at various locations throughout the airfield. Each of the aircraft contained twenty-five dignitaries and five crew members. On the morning of July 28, dignitaries from the State Department and Israeli business people from the Jewish National Fund America were scheduled to visit the financial district in Wilmington. They were scheduled to fly to San Diego, California, and must depart the airport on schedule to rendezvous with Department of State, Secretary Condoleezza Rice who has guaranteed their safety while traveling in the United States. Any delay or cancellation of the three chartered airplanes would indicate Wilmington is not a secure location in which to invest and could be an embarrassment to the national security.

The focus of the exercise was on four separate scenarios. The overarching scenario of a terrorist attack on the New Castle Airport is broken down accordingly:

- Scenario 1 involved preventing a suicide bomber from gaining access to the passenger terminal, and identifying and detaining a handler (ANG ramp).
- Scenario 2 involved an active hijacking aboard a commercial jet (Taxiway “M”).
- Scenario 3 involved a suicide vest detonation outside an aircraft, causing a mass casualty incident with an unexploded secondary device (Taxiway “G”).
- Scenario 4 involved a suicide bomber out in the open with civilians in the line of fire (ANG ramp).<sup>210</sup>

The exercise scenario evolved in the following sequence. The initial two aircraft had taxied out of the parking area and onto the taxiways. The third aircraft was rushing to load passengers to make an on-time departure. The aircraft were expected to depart within five minutes of each other. Each aircraft had been infiltrated by two suicide bombers, who intend to strike simultaneously to represent a terrorist cell attacking multi-targets. The locations of each incident were to be the Air National Guard ramp, the anti-

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<sup>210</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise, After Action Report/Improvement Plan* (DE: Delaware Emergency Management Agency, January 2008), 11.

hijacking event on taxiway “M,” and the mass casualty incident on taxiway “G.” On the morning of the exercise, a pre-scripted conversation between the three aircraft and the air traffic control tower set the stage for the exercise events to evolve. One aircraft was on the approach end of the runway preparing to enter the active runway. The second aircraft was taxiing out to join the first aircraft. The third aircraft parked on the Air National Guard ramp was waiting for passengers arriving late for processing.

Each incident was designed to test various areas in the Suicide Bomber Response Framework. The first incident was staged at the Air National Guard ramp passenger processing station where the dignitaries would arrive on a twenty-five passenger bus and proceed through the processing line, into a waiting area, and then eventually be escorted across the tarmac onto the aircraft. Once the passengers arrived at the aircraft a sequence of events unfolded. The primary objectives at this juncture were to test law enforcement’s knowledge of suicide bomber recognition and characteristics, concentric rings of security, and suicide bomber “handler” recognition. Additionally, the incident was designed to test two procedures, one for close quarter prevention within 25 feet when confronted with a suicide bomber and the other for open area confrontation on an airport ramp beyond 300 feet.

The bomber arrived on the bus with the dignitaries and processed through the line. The individual playing the role of the suicide bomber was instructed to perform in a particular manner that should alert law enforcement personnel (e.g., clean shaven, mumbling “Allahu akbar,” avoiding eye contact, wearing inappropriate clothing, etc.). A suicide bomber vest was pre-positioned in the aircraft lavatory where it would be strapped on by the bomber. The scenario was designed so the passengers once aboard would wait approximately 30 minutes while events unfold at the other locations. The pilot would then advise the tower he was concerned about the situation and would offload the passengers, sending them back to the processing center, a distance of 100 yards. Half way across the tarmac if the bomber was not yet recognized, the dignitaries were instructed to panic. Half of the contingent would run in various directions, while the other half would fall to the ground. The design was intended to observe what law enforcement would do with a suicide bomber in the open with innocent civilians within the kill zone.

The second incident tested the airport authority and local law enforcement on anti-hijack procedures with a suicide bomber on the aircraft. The aircraft was pre-positioned on one of the taxi ways and role players were located inside the Air National Guard command center where they represented the pilot, and one of the suicide bombers. The air traffic control tower instructed the pilot on the proper anti-hijacking procedures according to Standard Operation Procedures. Once the negotiation team arrived and made contact, the suicide bomber was instructed to make unreasonable demands and threats based on the negotiating teams' tactics. This portion of the exercise lasted approximately two hours. Even though nobody was on board the aircraft the windows were obscured so SWAT teams could not see movement inside the flight station and were unaware if personnel were actually located on the aircraft. This portion of the exercise tested the ability of the SWAT teams to position for breaching an aircraft and for the negotiation team to attempt a dialogue with the suicide bomber. This also met the requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the airfield to renew its FAA Part 139 Certification by incorporating all elements in responding to a hijacking and mass casualty events.

The final incident involved an explosion in front of an aircraft creating a mass casualty incident. The scenario was designed for the aircraft commander, after listening on the radio to the events taking place on the Air National Guard ramp and the hijacking attempt on another taxiway, to taxi his aircraft to another part of the airfield and deplane the passengers. While deplaning the suicide bomber decided to detonate his explosives in front of the aircraft, killing ten passengers. Mannequins were used to represent the victims, with one serving as the second suicide bomber with an attached explosive vest. The other passengers were moulaged to represent various forms of trauma. The design was intended to prompt the response procedures for a post suicide bomber detonation with a secondary device. The emphasis was on scene control and access, force protection, radio use, triage, and evidence preservation. In addition, each agency was observed on how well personnel utilized time, distance, and shielding once they realized a secondary device existed.

Each incident was structured to facilitate the need for a unified command and prompt the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure. Because of

the geographical considerations of the airfield, an Area Command would have to be implemented and the use of the Incident Management Teams recommended. Both of these requirements were pre-arranged. This exercise was very complex and was intentionally designed to exceed the available resources of any single agency.

Full-scale exercises are typically the most complex and resource-intensive type of exercise. These multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional exercises test many facets of emergency response and recovery. They include many first responders operating under an Incident Command System or Unified Command System to effectively and efficiently respond to, and initiate recovery from, an incident. Events are projected through a scripted exercise scenario with built-in flexibility to allow updates to drive activity. The full-scale exercise is conducted in a real-time, stressful environment that closely mirrors a real event. First responders and resources are mobilized and deployed to the scene where they conduct actions as if a real incident had occurred, with minor accommodations for safety.<sup>211</sup>

Although the responding agencies knew the exercise would consist of a suicide bomber scenario, they were expected to respond as they normally would during a high visibility situation. No participating agency had developed a suicide bomber response plan. There were approximately three hundred participants from various agencies throughout the state to include state and local police SWAT and bomb disposal units, local and airport fire service, emergency medical personnel, and air traffic control tower personnel.

#### **D. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EVALUATION GUIDES**

Exercise Evaluation Guides assist exercise evaluators by providing consistent standards and guidelines for observation, data collection, analysis, and report writing. Two separate sets of Exercise Evaluation Guides were used in this exercise. One set was used by evaluators who evaluated responders according to standard law enforcement, fire service, and EMS response procedures. The other set of evaluators evaluated the responses according to Exercise Evaluation Guides developed specifically for the

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<sup>211</sup> DHS, *HSEEP, Volume I*, 11.

exercise which corresponded to the newly developed Suicide Bomber Response Framework. A basic overview of the exercise scenario evaluation areas is located in Appendix A.

There are two hundred identified observation tasks that were taken from the response framework. The targeted observations were organized into seventeen categories according to related responses and added to the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Exercise Evaluation Guide template. These templates were put into a binder and the binders given to each of the selected evaluators. The evaluators came from multiple disciplines and response backgrounds, but had the benefit of previous suicide bomber response training courses.

#### **E. THE AFTER ACTION REPORT PROCESS**

After the exercise was completed, separate After Action Reports were produced and then compared with each other to identify which write ups held consistencies between the two teams of evaluators. The results were then filtered to identify the standard response procedures in need of agency improvement. The After Action Reports were then compared to the suicide bomber response framework to assess if there were any stunning differences in the response procedures of law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service agencies without a suicide bomber response policy in place and the proposed Suicide Bomber Response Framework.

#### **F. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXERCISE AND RESEARCH**

During the exercise planning meetings, the FBI indicated intelligence of this nature received on the airport would prompt a preemptive shut down of the facility. Keeping the airport open was deemed one of the artificialities that had to be built into the scenario.

An area of response not covered by the response framework is the need to incorporate technology into the response plan, such as jamming or explosive detection devices.

It should be noted the law enforcement agencies evaluated were highly trained from special weapons and tactics teams and explosive ordinance teams. The identified gaps could be more profound with the deployment of less specialized officers. The

contrived and artificial nature of exercises should not be discounted. Agencies and participants consistently demonstrate a less than engaged and committed attitude toward participating in exercise endeavors.

Although a Post Blast Investigation was not conducted due to time constraints, a post-exercise discussion was clearly needed so questions involving crime scene investigation and the post blast investigation would be addressed. In addition, the question was posed as to how forensics tasks would merge with these other post-event requirements. There are many questions with respect to contaminated evidence, hand-offs, preservation of crime scene, and roles/responsibilities.<sup>212</sup>

While researching the procedures in the framework, and through conversations with law enforcement officers, it was identified the most controversial aspect of developing this particular type of plan was establishing a “shoot-to-kill” policy that was acceptable to human rights proponents and individual state judicial systems. Law Enforcement officers need to understand the application of existing departmental use-of-force policies to the suicide bomber threat.<sup>213</sup>

#### **G. SHOOT-TO-KILL**

The last few years have witnessed a proliferation of “shoot-to-kill” policies designed for use against those suspected of taking part in terrorist activity around the world. In the United States, while not official government policy, the IACP Training Keys provides a useful insight to the content of the policies. The IACP Training Keys are representative of “shoot-to-kill” policies emergent in the wake of 11 September 2001. The documents also have the potential to influence the adoption and implementation of future “shoot-to-kill” policies by United States police departments because the departments are currently debating the adoption of such policies. Police officers are increasingly relied upon, and receive training in counterterrorism activities. Local police departments have independent authority to adopt and implement the use of force policies. The IACP is extensively involved in the training of United States police officers, including training on the use of force.

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<sup>212</sup> John King, Suicide Bomber evaluator during the exercise, a statement from his After Action Report.

<sup>213</sup> Steger, “Can U.S. Defeat the Suicide/Homicide-Bomber Threat?” 12.

The IACP Training Keys are emblematic of two trends in “shoot-to-kill” policies. The first trend is the use of certain behavior and other indicators to detect a suicide bomber. The second trend is the removal of use of force safeguards. While the use of lethal force may under certain circumstances be both necessary and justified, especially when responding to the imminent detonation of a bomb, the Training Keys promote the use of lethal force even when the threat of harm is not imminent and where the very existence of a bomb has not been confirmed. Instead, officers are encouraged to infer the existence of the “capability to detonate” a bomb or the threat of such use on the basis of overly-broad physical and behavioral characteristics, that will in the overwhelming number of cases end up targeting Muslims, Arabs and South Asians, or those perceived to be Muslim, Arab, or South Asian.<sup>214</sup>

Specifically, the Training Keys:

- Reject the requirement of imminent threat.
- Omit reference to the requirement lethal force be “necessary.”
- Fail to ensure responses to potential suicide bombers will be intelligence-led and instead focus on ill-conceived stereotypes and behavioral indicators that are contradictory, over-broad, biased, and prone to error.
- Do not reflect on the importance and nature of a command structure to ensure uses of force are appropriately controlled.
- Fail to contemplate the wide-range of potential suicide bomber scenarios or the wide range of responses the scenarios may attract.

One of the greatest trusts placed upon a law enforcement officer is the responsibility of balancing the constitutional interest of an individual against the interest of a society that believes the use of force against an individual is constitutionally permissible, when reasonable and necessary requirements under the law have been met. This balance of responsibility holds law enforcement officers strictly accountable for the discriminate use of force based on the lawfulness of the officer’s decision. Law

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<sup>214</sup> *Racial Profiling and Lethal Force in the “War on Terror”* (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, Written Submission to Human Rights Committee, 87<sup>th</sup> Session, July 2006), 1-3.

enforcement officers must be ready to justify their use of force; within the constitutional and judicial standard of reasonableness at the instant the force was used.

Every use of force application by an officer will be reviewed, critiqued, and ultimately judged by society, the civil and criminal courts, and the law enforcement officer's agency or department. This evolving standard mandates a reasonable decision, by the officer, when confronted with a situation where use of force is applied. In most cases, the decision must be made in a split second, in circumstances which are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.

The standards of conduct controlling law enforcement's use of deadly force are based on common law statutes, modified common law statutes, and model penal code. The standards are further modified by individual state and federal statutes, on-going court decisions, departmental or agency policy, and guidelines. The law enforcement officer must know the laws, policies and guidelines of the assigned jurisdiction, how these govern professional use of deadly force and how the use of force may result in departmental action or personal civil and criminal actions in state or federal court.<sup>215</sup>

The U.S. Capitol Police adopted a "shoot-to-kill" policy for suicide bombers in February 2004. According to the policy, officers are trained to recognize the "usual traits and characteristics of suicide bombers" and are instructed to "aim for the head." The adoption of "shoot-to-kill" policies is currently being debated by law enforcement officials in the United States, at least one of whom has stated "shoot-to-kill" would be the "inevitable policy" following a suicide bombing in the nation. On December 7, 2005, U.S. Federal Air Marshals shot and killed Rigoberto Alpizar, a 44-year-old American citizen of Costa Rican descent. Prior to the shooting, Alpizar and his wife had boarded a flight in Miami headed to Orlando. Following an argument with his wife, Alpizar, who was visibly agitated and clutching his bag, ran to the front of the airline declaring he had to get off the plane. After Air Marshals became involved and began to escort Alpizar off the plane, his wife ran after them yelling her husband, who suffered from bi-polar disorder, was ill, and off his medication. After being removed from the plane, Alpizar was shot and killed on the jet-way, allegedly as he was reaching for his bag. Different

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<sup>215</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, *Shoot/Don't Shoot Study Guide* (2003), 1.



accounts exist as to whether Alpizar claimed he had a bomb. On May 23, 2006, the staffing/review team investigating events at the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office determined "the shooting officers were legally justified in their use of force and no criminal charges will be filed."<sup>216</sup>

Policies that instruct law enforcement on how to respond to potential suicide bombers must not remove the usual safeguards attached to the use of force. These requirements include:

- a. Proportionality, including in the context of use of force against terrorism suspects.
- b. Necessity.
- c. Use of non-lethal means where feasible.

Removing the requirement a threat is imminent, and lethal force is necessary, encouraging the use of lethal force on the basis of mere suspicion, or failing to require a reasonable basis to believe the suspect has a bomb to detonate results in stripping the use-of-force of its usual safeguards. This removal or watering down of safeguards on the use of lethal force amounts to a tacit assertion that current uses of force standards are inapplicable or ineffective in countering real suicide bombing threats. Such an assertion misses the function of prevailing legal standards on the use of lethal force, which is not to deny law enforcement officials the authority to use lethal force when required, but rather to ensure that lethal force is used only when required. Law enforcement officers may use deadly force only when "necessary," that is, when the officer has a "reasonable belief" the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person.

The context of "necessary/necessity" means no other reasonable alternative is available. All other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to the officer or other persons have failed or would be likely to fail. There is no safe alternative to using deadly force, and without it, the officer or others would face imminent and grave

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<sup>216</sup> *Racial Profiling and Lethal Force*, 1-3.

danger of death or serious physical injury. An officer is not required to place their self, another officer, a suspect, or the public in unreasonable danger of death or serious physical injury before using deadly force.

The context of “reasonable belief” or probable cause means facts and circumstances, including inferences drawn by the officer when deadly force is used, would cause a reasonable officer to believe the point at issue is probably true. The reasonable belief or decision must be viewed from the perspective of the officer on the scene, who may often be forced to make split second decisions in circumstances that are tense, unpredictable, and rapidly evolving. Reasonable belief is not to be viewed from the calm vantage point of hindsight. Included in the totality of circumstances used to determine reasonable belief are the factors of *ability* and *opportunity*. The suspect must have the *ability* to inflict serious bodily harm or death. This *ability* must be depicted by a deadly weapon (gun, knife, etc.) or the person’s overwhelming physical advantage (size, fighting skills karate, boxing, etc.). *Opportunity* is established when the suspect is in a position in which they can use their ability to threaten human life.<sup>217</sup>

The IACP is the foremost authority to date in the United States on the development of suicide bomber response training for law enforcement agencies. Their training guide is riddled with controversy over the “shoot-to-kill” suggested procedures. Much of the controversy toward accepting a “shoot-to-kill” policy in this nation is weighed against other countries not accepting this type of policy. Before suicide bomber tactics become prevalent in the homeland and “shoot-to-kill” policies are hastily developed, agencies should at least start reviewing laws and statutes currently in place which can guide their states or disciplines in the development of a unified “shoot-to-kill” policy. Through this preventive approach, the invested parties can ensure the upholding the civil rights of society and the professional integrity of their respective disciplines.

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<sup>217</sup> IACP, *Shoot/Don’t Shoot Study Guide*, 6-7.

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## **VI. EXERCISE RESULTS**

### **A. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS**

The most important short-comings of the full-scale exercise scenario are noted in this section. The scope of exercise findings is multi-disciplinary in nature, with the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline bearing equal scrutiny.

The implementation observed by the suicide bomber evaluators were compiled and the results point to a need for advancement in the following areas. This list is not all inclusive but just a sampling of the disparities between Standard Operating Procedures and those procedures recommended by the Suicide Bomber Response Framework. It is not the intent of this paper to report the total findings of the After Action Report, but to establish whether or not current response procedures are sufficient to prevent suicide bomber attacks in the United States.

Most participating agencies enacted thorough response plans. However, many agencies lacked plans for integrated response operations.<sup>218</sup> Evidence of this was demonstrated by the fact the Tactical Interoperable Communications plan was never fully implemented and law enforcement did not demonstrate interoperable communications capabilities with other participating agencies. Joint planning and communication capabilities are integral to a successful response to an attack on critical infrastructure.<sup>219</sup>

In addition to substandard planning and communication, several gaps in agency plans were identified. Safe standoff distances, perimeters, and exclusionary zones for suicide bombings should be incorporated into standard operating procedures of all law enforcement, fire department, and emergency medical personnel.<sup>220</sup> Shortcomings were noticed in the following areas: there was no attempt to capture withdrawing suicide bomber support team members; Neither site deployed counter-surveillance teams to look for individuals engaging in intelligence collection or to search for any logistical support

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<sup>218</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 12.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

team that could be attempting to flee the surrounding area; and in addition, there were no attempts to apprehend those responsible for the attack or prevent further attacks.

Although initial deployment to the terminal was adequate and conducted professionally, there was no clear indication of when command was established, who the Incident Commander was, or where the incident command post was located. There was no transition from incident command to unified command. No incident action plan was developed, and a communications unit leader was never identified.<sup>221</sup> This lack of a strategic plan and tactical objectives led to confusion, this in turn led to freelancing at the incident site. Instead of having a methodical approach to incident stabilization, responders lacked direction and clear goals.<sup>222</sup> The early development of an incident action plan upon arrival at an incident site should be emphasized. The SWAT members had some difficulty integrating their response capabilities quickly because of the lack of an IAP.<sup>223</sup>

Although incident command was eventually established to varying degrees in the field, incident commanders did not formally establish command or provide adequate initial on-scene reporting. This resulted in discrepancies between incident command and area command, notably the variation in the naming of the incident sites, which led to confusion during communication between the two commands. Because there was little effort to establish unified command at the incident sites, representatives from the area command were used to transmit communications. This hampered the efficiency of the response.<sup>224</sup> Therefore, most information shared among fire, EMS, law enforcement, and airport operations was exchanged within area command.<sup>225</sup>

## **B. THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD INCIDENT**

The initial law enforcement response to the Air National Guard ramp, after intelligence was received from the fusion center, was well planned and organized. Uniformed officers established an outer perimeter, while plain clothes and SWAT

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<sup>221</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 15.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

officers conducted reconnaissance on the immediate area, the terminal, and the vehicles in the immediate area. However, outside the perimeter cars were not searched with K-9 teams and Vehicle Identification Numbers and license plate checks were not performed.

There were no concentric rings of security established with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. A female role-player was allowed to walk across the aircraft parking ramp from the command post building to the passenger processing station, a distance of over a hundred yards, under no concealment. She approached the back-side of the building where the passengers would exit after processing. She did this twice before being stopped by law enforcement and questioned. Had adequate security been in place she would have been detained long before she reached the building and became a security threat.

Before the arrival of the dignitaries, law enforcement should have been searching the area for suspicious personnel, a third party (handler). The handler in this exercise was located in plain view and was in position 10 minutes before the arrival of the bus. At one time he was within 10 feet of a SWAT member for approximately 20 minutes; he had been standing in this location for more than an hour before Air Force Security Police (non-exercise players) became suspicious of him. Law enforcement personnel did not engage the handler until they saw Air Force Security Police talking to him. Law enforcement personnel then questioned the handler, and since he was not perceived as a threat at that time they returned to their positions. The entire time he was being questioned, the handler had his cell phone in his hand and had a clear view of the processing center and the aircraft. Approximately 11 minutes later, law enforcement decided he may be a potential threat and they took him in to custody. After further questioning they released him once again. If this scenario were real, then all three aircraft could have been blown up and at least ninety people killed. Had law enforcement had more extensive training in suicide bomber tactics, they would have identified the individual as a threat with the capability to trigger the explosives by cell phone.

Upon arrival, the bus transporting the dignitaries was directed to a parking space away from the main terminal where passengers could offload the bus under the supervision of several assigned law enforcement personnel. Some passengers were

briefly searched and then permitted to proceed to the terminal security inspection station.<sup>226</sup> Law enforcement was suspicious about the bomber and he was searched when he got off the bus. After a cursory check he was allowed to proceed through the processing station. The passengers were not confirmed against the manifest. Had this been done they would have seen the bomber was not listed on it. The first suicide bomber was to have been a diversion. The second suicide bomber (the bus driver), was to carry the explosives into the processing area once the passengers had been allowed to enter the processing line. This plan was thwarted when law enforcement searched the bus and discovered the explosive device before the driver could get to it. However, they did not identify the driver as a suspect and allowed him to leave the area.

Upon discovery of the improvised explosive device, the bomb squad was requested and a SWAT team deployed around the inner perimeter. A robot was used at the incident as much as possible but was unable to enter the bus where the explosive device was found. Passengers were still allowed to board the aircraft per the Exercise Director, an artificiality that had to be built into the scenario. Incident command should have quickly transferred to a unified command at this juncture, but this did not occur.<sup>227</sup> When members of the EOD and SWAT were asked where their incident command was located they responded by stating that the area command was the incident command.

Tactical teams from the County Police Department and the state that were involved in this exercise need to train together regularly to become familiar with each other's capabilities and shortcomings, and to establish protocols for an emergency response to an attack on critical infrastructure. This should include a predetermined tactical communications method and pre-established contacts. Because these tactical teams respond to incidents in the same jurisdiction, this issue must be addressed. The tactical operations during the exercise ran well despite this shortcoming, mainly because of experienced leadership within the teams. Training together and knowing each other's tactics, operating procedures, policies, and plans for handling critical incidents will enhance the success and efficiency of a response.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 15.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

### **C. THE ANTI-HIJACKING INCIDENT**

There were no significant shortcomings to note at the anti-hijacking incident. The county Special Weapons and Tactics team and their negotiator worked through both prevention and response aspects of the scenario.

### **D. MASS CASUALTY INCIDENT**

The first-arriving units on the scene staged away from the scene and gathered information regarding the incident. The Fire Chief, EOD Team, and assisting fire companies arrived shortly afterward. None of the units attempted to block access or otherwise secure the perimeter of the incident scene in which there remained a suspected IED. No hot zones, warm zones, cold zones, or security zones were established or otherwise communicated to emergency responders.<sup>229</sup>

Access to the interior crime scene was not secured. Individuals could have approached the crime scene from any point in a 360 degree radius; there were no entry control points. None of the locations used crime scene logs to document activities and first responders were not logged in or out for accountability.

Initial attempts by personnel on the Rescue unit to establish a perimeter were halted by County EOD after the possibility of an additional IED was communicated. At this point, firefighters were largely inactive until the State SWAT team arrived on the scene and began to extract victims. During this time, personnel on the scene did not (and were apparently not directed to) deploy around the perimeter. Two witnesses to the incident were able to run through the incident scene to report what they had seen to firefighters.<sup>230</sup> Had appropriate perimeters been established the witnesses would have been intercepted prior to reaching the incident scene, therefore eliminating or reducing the possibility of evidence being disturbed. All responding agencies need to be cognizant that this type of incident needs to be treated as a crime scene and every effort needs to be made to preserve possible evidence.

In addition to previously mentioned shortcomings, responding fire department units, incident command, and law enforcement units staged too close to the scene. The

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<sup>229</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 24.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*



first arriving fire department unit positioned less than 100 feet from the outer edges of the victims. The Incident Commander, followed by the EOD, also positioned on the scene approximately 300 feet from the incident. They were followed by arriving EMS units that were approximately 400 feet from the incident. EMS units and triage were partially shielded by a warehouse building.<sup>231</sup> However, fire personnel positioned themselves between the explosive device and their vehicle, failing to utilize it as a protective shield. It was apparent that standard time, distance and shielding principles as applied to explosive devices were not being adhered to.

In all instances, units responding to the incident were too close to the scene, given the possibility of an IED. First responders did not seek appropriate cover and were not aware of blast concussion rebound or shrapnel effects. The safe standoff distance (taken from the unclassified *IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet*)<sup>232</sup> for an outdoor evacuation of a pipe bomb is 850 feet. This is based on a pipe bomb containing approximately 5 pounds of explosive material. For a suicide vest, which can contain up to 20 pounds of explosive material, the distance for outdoor evacuation is 1,360 feet. All units and personnel operating on the scene were within this perimeter boundary.<sup>233</sup>

Personnel from the Rescue unit told the Exercise Controller that they were aware of the potential for inadvertently detonating the secondary device through the use of portable radios. The Rescue unit refrained from using portable radios in the identified hot zone, and used face-to-face communications whenever possible. Proper exclusionary zones for radio use near an improvised explosive device (IED) were not explicitly stated,<sup>234</sup> the safe radio frequency exclusionary distances were unknown. Other responders may have been within this distance.<sup>235</sup> This information was not provided to all the first responders at the incident by either the Incident Commander or area command.

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<sup>231</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 19.

<sup>232</sup> A copy of the *IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet* can be found on the Southern Alleghany EMS website, [www.saems.com/downloads/standoff.pdf](http://www.saems.com/downloads/standoff.pdf).

<sup>233</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 20.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

Undeterred by a lack of personnel, law enforcement assessed the situation, determined appropriate operational procedures, and implemented plans. Although the plans were discussed, nothing was written down or recorded. This may have been because of the lack of available personnel.<sup>236</sup> This situation could possibly have been alleviated by a fully functioning Unified Command. Use of a status board or other type of documentation could be valuable to responding law enforcement agencies, both during an incident and afterward, when an agency is asked to recount its participation in or response to an incident.<sup>237</sup>

The first firefighters from the Rescue unit arrived at the scene and staged nearby. Shortly thereafter, three members of the county EOD team were the initial responding law enforcement element. Upon arriving at the scene, they began to discuss the information they had been provided, as well as their strategic approach. They did an exceptional job of formulating a verbal IAP for their agency with minimal staff. Law enforcement personnel at this incident were minimal because of the other three concurrent scenarios. Mutual aid would have been used in a real-world incident.<sup>238</sup> They did not request additional resources through the area command that would allow them to successfully respond to all three incidents in a timely and effective manner.

Upon receiving an initial situational report, the EOD team repositioned its vehicle to a more strategic location.<sup>239</sup> The county EOD team was the only law enforcement element on the scene for a large part of the incident. They established an on-site command for their agency<sup>240</sup> since no unified command structure had been established.

The Rescue crew members began to examine and triage some of the victims at the scene, but were pulled out, presumably because EOD perceived the threat of a secondary device on one of the victims. Shortly afterward, the Rescue crew encountered two

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<sup>236</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 22.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

witnesses who reported that there was an explosion with a white cloud. After receiving the report, the crew remained outside of the immediate scene, awaiting direction and clearance from EOD to enter and remove victims.

Firefighters from Rescue communicated to victims near the airplane over the public address system, instructing those who were ambulatory to distance themselves from the suspected IED, which was attached to one of the unresponsive victims. Several victims were able to move away from the airplane, and were thoroughly searched by EOD personnel for potential bombs. Meanwhile, those unable to move remained near the airplane, with rescue and treatment unavailable to them. Additionally, an actor simulating a self-dispatching nurse was able to enter the scene and begin providing treatment to injured victims. Attempts were made to persuade this nurse to leave the scene. Had there been a security perimeter established, the nurse and the witnesses would have been stopped at the perimeter of the scene.<sup>241</sup> The on-scene commander advised law enforcement about a person rendering medical assistance at the incident site who had professed to be a nurse. Upon learning of this person, law enforcement stated that she could remain in the incident area as long as she was assisting and not hurting anyone.<sup>242</sup>

Seventy-eight minutes after the initial response an integrated team of SWAT and fire department personnel entered the area and began to remove victims. Delays in entering the incident scene because of the presence of an explosive device or hazardous material are a precaution taken in the interest of responder safety. However, in the 78 minutes it took before entry was made, the condition of many victims in a real incident would have deteriorated significantly.<sup>243</sup> In Israel they refer to the “golden ten-minute rule:” get to the victims during the critical minutes after an attack, when prompt medical attention—maintain airways, controlling external hemorrhages — can mean the difference between life and death.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 24.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, 18-19.

<sup>244</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “Aftermath,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, (January/February 2004): 2, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200401/hoffman> [Accessed December 8, 2006].

When law enforcement entered the blast area to search for the victims they were moving the dead. This was an unnecessary risk because of the potential for another explosive device on one of the bodies. A robot could have been used during the mass casualty incident however; one was never utilized even though there was positive identification of a second explosive device attached to an incapacitated terrorist. In this type of incident it would be expected that a significant amount of blood and body parts would be present. First responders did not adhere to universal precautions for dealing with bodily fluids; at a minimum they should have worn personal protection equipment such as gauze masks, gloves, eyewear, and boot coverings. When law enforcement was removing casualties from the incident area, the professed nurse indicated that one of the casualties had some type of wire or device in his hand. The officers continued to remove casualties from the area, not focusing on the device until the last living casualty stated that the man next to her had a device with wires in his hand.<sup>245</sup> Law enforcement could have used lethal force tactics against the incapacitated terrorist with the attached secondary device while simultaneously attending to the casualties.

Law enforcement officers interviewed two of the initial four witnesses; however, the two remaining witnesses were not interviewed. Officers questioned victims/suspects as they were assembled in the designated area.<sup>246</sup> Additional information was provided to the Incident Commander by firefighters after two witnesses provided reports of what they saw. This would have been helpful if law enforcement had started an investigation right away, each witness had information that would have helped in the investigation process. During the hot wash, personnel on the Rescue unit reported that they had communicated to command that the witnesses had observed a white cloud with the explosion. The firefighter stated that there was a concern about the white cloud, as it may have indicated the presence of a chemical agent. Personnel with another fire unit stated that they did not hear this radio traffic, and that it may have been broadcast on a channel not available to them. The Incident Commander did not relay this information to other incoming units. As a result, detection and monitoring equipment on an assisting fire companies apparatus,

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<sup>245</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 22.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

which could have been used to confirm or rule out chemical involvement, was not used or brought to the location of the Rescue unit.<sup>247</sup> The presence or absence of a chemical agent was never determined.

During the hot wash, participants noted that the single channel all responders could use to communicate was crowded and confusing, as personnel at three separate incident scenes were trying to use it. Responders stated that there was initial confusion about which transmissions referred to which incident scene. The fact that all responders were working on one channel did not contribute to clarity and efficiency.<sup>248</sup>

The initial EMS response lacked direction, as well as triage and treatment areas, until midway into the incident. No EMS supervisor was identified nor was there one present when emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from the first ambulance reported to the command post. EMS command did not arrive on scene until more than an hour into the incident. Until EMS command arrived, there was no organized effort to set up a triage area or to assess and treat the patients who had been evacuated from the hazard area. This was despite the fact that the need to set up a triage area was articulated by the Rescue unit and the first-arriving basic life support (BLS) unit.

Throughout the triage effort, the ambulances were positioned in the road next to the triage area with their engines running. They were lined up in such a way that they had to be driven toward the incident to transport patients away from the triage area. It may have been better to stage ambulances farther away from the treatment area until they were needed.<sup>249</sup> Furthermore, no police officer was designated to accompany the ambulances to the hospital in order to brief hospital personnel about possible secondary devices or preserve evidence if found.

Emergency Medical Service personnel were not adequately briefed on the issue of the secondary explosive device. The ambulance crews were not allowed to transport victims to the hospital until it was determined that they were clear of any explosive device. However, during this waiting period, the ambulance crew remained in the

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<sup>247</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 26.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

immediate vicinity of the walking wounded. If waiting to provide treatment to the victims was a safety precaution because of the possibility of a secondary device, then responders should not have remained near the victims.<sup>250</sup>

To sum up the areas of improvement that would be applicable for the entire region and across all disciplines are:

1. National Incident Management System (NIMS) – Training and Structure with guidelines and policy.
2. Perimeter Security – Use of concentric rings of security.
3. Communications – No communications between units or departments.
4. Preliminary Investigations – Training and sharing of information.
5. No written policy or guidelines for suicide bombers.
6. Interagency agreements – Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and training.

Marksmanship proficiency also needs more attention, especially at longer distances. In dealing with IEDs the operating principle is both clear and simple: *distance equals survival*. Improved marksmanship proficiency, coupled with ready access to urban patrol rifles, will greatly enhance officer survivability in the interdiction of suicide bombers.<sup>251</sup>

The preparedness capabilities of U.S. domestic emergency-services agencies must be expanded and improved from the basic skills level up through the command level, particularly in development of the tactics needed to deal with the pre-detonation and post-detonation aspects of martyrdom criminal attacks.

Homeland law enforcement training, tactics, policies, procedures and technology all should be adapted to a “full engagement” mode to deal effectively with the suicide bomber scenario. This is not theory and not a supposition. It is, rather, one of the real-life situational realities of domestic law-enforcement operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> *New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise*, 31.

<sup>251</sup> Steger, “Can U.S. Defeat the Suicide/Homicide-Bomber Threat?” 12.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

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## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. OBSERVATIONS**

The Suicide Bomber Response Framework tested in the exercise demonstrated a significant gap between response procedures cited in Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) and what is recommended by the IACP and subject matter experts.

Local law enforcement agencies will have to adapt their traditional policies and training to address new dangers when confronting suicide bombers. Changes cannot take place simply on paper. Nor can changes be limited to specialized units, because beat officers are the most likely to find themselves facing suicide bombers on the street. Those officers, as in all situations, must be able to rely on having received adequate, progressive training, not the luck of the day. The traditional training given to most officers provides them with tools that may actually increase the suicide bombers' chance of success. Therefore, the United States should craft "a specific framework" for individual states to follow so they may develop a unified approach to a suicide bomber response. The policy ensures a standard that police officers can be trained to in the likely event suicide bombers will strike the United States.

### **B. A STRATEGY CANVAS**

The following strategy canvas in Figure 1 depicts an analytical tool that is both a diagnostic and an action framework. The analytical framework of the strategy canvas serves two purposes. First, it captures the current state of play in the known implementation of suicide bomber response framework in graphic form. On the canvas strategy, the horizontal axis captures the primary differences between recommended practices and already established response procedures that are identified in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Guides during the full scale exercise. The vertical axis of the strategy canvas visually captures the degree of emphasis the author perceived in executing suicide bomber response procedures versus standard operating procedures.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Concept borrowed from "Blue Ocean Strategy."



Strategy Canvas: Gap Comparison between the Suicide Bomber Response Framework and the actual First Responders response.




Figure 1. Strategy Canvas: Gap Comparison

The Suicide Bomber Response Framework was tested in the full scale exercise. The results indicate a significant gap between response procedures that exist in the current Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) and what is recommended by the IACP and subject matter experts. It is therefore recommended a suicide bomber response plan, drawn from the Suicide Bomber Response Framework, be developed and institutionalized into the standard operating procedures of the affected disciplines.

The Suicide Bomber Response Framework in Appendix B should be recommended and made available to the affected disciplines for the development of a local suicide bomber response plan. Every first responder, whether fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, etc, should be cognizant of this issue. However, the predominance of the disciplines is likely to refuse to accept the emergence of this tactic as a reality. Developing a suicide bomber plan will not be high priority for many agencies, with most balking at the notion of spending valuable resources on a plan deemed "unlikely to happen here." There will be a myriad of obstacles and excuses in every organization to the development and implementation of such a politically risky plan. The acceptance of the framework by law enforcement may ultimately depend on the emphasis leaders in homeland security assign to the development of a national response plan. The initiative for states and local law enforcement agencies to develop a suicide bomber response plan will undoubtedly have to be pushed down from the

Department of Homeland Security with correlating funding to support the proposal. However, every incident is initially local. Therefore, the final onus will be placed on the responding local agency in a suicide bomber incident as to whether the approach to a suicide bombing response was executed in a proactive or reactive manner.

However, the determination needed to move forward and face these hurdles can be summarized in the cogent, immortal words of Dr. Martin Luther King,

*There comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular; one must take it because it is right.*

### **C. TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS**

Once agencies have developed a Suicide Bomber Response Plan their training departments can create training courses at the awareness, operational and command level to educate not only their agency personnel but all the response disciplines identified by homeland security. The Prevention and Response to Suicide Bomber course at New Mexico Tech is a train-the-trainer course designed to provide advanced training in responding to suicide bombing attacks. The course includes detailed instruction on improvised explosive devices (IED) and explosive materials typically used in suicide bombing attacks. In addition, it features range demonstrations of explosive effects and comprehensive training on critical response actions during pre- and post-detonation operations. The course addresses actions and programs designed to prevent or deter suicide bombings and techniques, tactics, procedures to respond to a variety of suicide bombing scenarios. Participants draft an action plan outline for preparing their agencies to address this developing, potential threat to communities in the United States.<sup>254</sup> The Suicide Bomber Mitigation Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is designed for law enforcement officers and agents, who would be involved in the security of people and assets, needed to prevent a suicide bomber attack and may actually encounter a suicide bomber.<sup>255</sup> The majority of these courses and packages can be funded at the state and local level using the homeland security grant funds, authorization will

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<sup>254</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), National Integration Center (NIC), Training and Exercise Integration Secretariat (TEI), course catalog, 123, [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TED\\_Course\\_Catalog\\_2007.pdf](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TED_Course_Catalog_2007.pdf) [Accessed January 23, 2008].

<sup>255</sup> Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, catalog of training programs, 34, <http://www.fletc.gov/training/cotp.pdf/view> [Accessed January 23, 2008].

vary by state. Every state has developed a unique formula for dispersing these funds; therefore each agency will have to contact their state training officer for further information. In addition, the homeland security grant funds can also be used to develop a state or agency suicide bomber course that could eventually be institutionalized into their state training academies. The following table lists some of the Suicide Bomber training resources that are available.

#### **D. PRIVATE SECTOR TRAINING INFLUENCE**

A significant portion of law enforcement training is designed and offered through private sector military companies such as Blackwater, SAIC, and Triple Canopy. Engaging these training partners in the review, support, and delivery of the Suicide Bomber Response Framework is a critical in-road to influencing the evolution of the training and policy priorities of local law enforcement entities. Many law enforcement entities address on-going staff training and development issues through these well-known private companies. The training and curriculum priorities of these companies serve as influential bench marks to the law enforcement community of the United States and should not be over-looked as a key partner to implementing this strategy.


Furthermore, the large private military companies have established contracting relationships with the Department of Homeland Security. The companies can also afford to employ the nation's highly effective lobby firms. If the companies identified a lucrative, and relevant, law enforcement training opportunity, they would be an ideal advocate to pursue congressional funding appropriations for this worthy body of work.

Table 1. Suicide Bomber Training Resources

Course	Institution	Location	Website
Prevention and Response to Suicide Bomber Incidents-Operations	New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology	Socorro, New Mexico	<a href="http://respond.emrtc.nmt.edu/prsbidesc.php">http://respond.emrtc.nmt.edu/prsbidesc.php</a>
Prevention and Response to Suicide Bomber Incidents-Awareness	New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology	Host-site	Training and Education Catalog <a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TED_Course_Catalog_2007.pdf">http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TED_Course_Catalog_2007.pdf</a>
Suicide Bomber Mitigation Training Program	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center	Glynco, Georgia	<a href="http://www.fletc.gov/training/cotp.pdf/view">http://www.fletc.gov/training/cotp.pdf/view</a>
Managing the Threat of Suicide Bombers and Improvised Explosive Devices	Homeland Defense Journal	Various	<a href="http://www.homelanddefensejournal.com/hdl/home.asp">http://www.homelanddefensejournal.com/hdl/home.asp</a>
Responding to the Threat of Suicide Bombings	Institute of Terrorism Research and Response	Varies	<a href="http://www.terrorresponse.org/itr-07-training.htm">http://www.terrorresponse.org/itr-07-training.htm</a>
Preparation for the Suicide Bomber TSP	Technical Support Working Group	Training Support Package	<a href="http://www.tswg.gov/subgroups/ttd/advanced-training-and-education/products.html">http://www.tswg.gov/subgroups/ttd/advanced-training-and-education/products.html</a>
Detecting and Responding to Suicide Bombers	International Association of Chiefs of Police		Training Keys #581 and #582 <a href="http://iacp.org/documents/index.cfm?document_id=708&amp;document_type_id=15&amp;fuseaction=document">http://iacp.org/documents/index.cfm?document_id=708&amp;document_type_id=15&amp;fuseaction=document</a>
Suicide/Homicide Bomber	National Tactical Officers Association		<a href="http://www.ntoa.org/specialty_courses.html">http:// www.ntoa.org/specialty_courses.html</a>

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## APPENDIX A. EXERCISE SCENARIO EVALUATION AREAS



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## **APPENDIX B. SUICIDE BOMBER RESPONSE FRAMEWORK**

**The following Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures may be utilized to identify, detain, apprehend or stop homicide bombers or suspected bombers on foot, in vehicles, or inside a structure.**

### **Incident response**

1. Reporting – How, when, and by whom the threat is received will significantly affect the actions to be taken. In the off chance that communication personnel should receive a tip or warning of a pending attack, communications personnel should take the following types of actions:

- a. Keep the reporting party on the line
- b. Identify the location of the purported attack or the location and direction of travel of the bomber
- c. Determine, if possible, the type of explosive involved, the manner of concealment, and the manner of detonation
- d. Accomplices or others involved
- e. Description of suspect
- f. Identity of caller

### **Institute radio discipline**

1. Sensitive information should not be transmitted on the radio to prevent interception by the media, other terrorists, public, etc.
2. Possible channel change for the entire event.
3. Ensure dispatchers notify necessary/appropriate response units.
4. Inform responding units on potential for secondary devices/suspects

### **Immediate Notification**

1. Watch Commander
2. Bomb Squad
3. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)



4. Airborne Law Enforcement
5. Canine teams
6. HazMat Resources
7. Fire and Rescue
8. Crime scene technicians
9. Public Information Officer
10. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Local Field Office
11. Operational Area multi-agency counterterrorism network (Terrorism Early Warning Group)
12. Alert communications Officer in Charge
13. Negotiator

*Note: Officers should not attempt negotiation or give warning. Neutralize suicide bombers once identified.*

#### Notification

1. Governors office
2. Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security
3. State and Local Emergency Management Agency
4. Department of Transportation

#### Responding Officer Actions

1. Vary route to the incident, final approach should be the same for all units so they arrive at the same mobilization point.
2. Awareness of secondary threats and hazards (devices, shooters, downed utilities, etc.)
3. Ensure route does not carry responders directly through event site
4. Expect to take casualties & plan for them.
5. You will probably not be able to stop the attack, so the goal is to contain and mitigate
6. Assume incident command responsibilities

*A visible security presence has been proven to be a significant deterrent for suicide terrorists-large police presence can be incalculably disruptive to the execution of a planned terrorist attack.*

#### Incident Command Post

1. First on scene search for secondary threats
2. Terrorist will attack in different places, at the same time, or in succession
3. Search Mobilization Points and Incident Command Post location
4. Search area is cordoned off, working outward – 50m, 100m, 250m, etc.
5. Identify and contain the suspect bomber
6. Provide description of suspect and probable location of bomb
7. Determine if deadly force is authorized and action can be taken effectively
8. Conduct a preliminary investigation
9. Immediately begin crime scene log to document activities
  - Everyone must be logged in and out of the scene for accountability and legal proceedings (to include witnesses on the scene)
10. Re-evaluate cordon/perimeter according to advice given by Bomb Technicians. The responding Bomb Technicians will offer an initial professional opinion, which will include information on the explosive device, mechanisms, quantity of explosives, and whether it was a bomber or a car.
11. Access to interior crime scene specifically limited to EMS, FD, and BT's until scene is determined cleared by Bomb Technicians.
12. Consider requesting assistance from structural engineers, utility personnel, and similar agencies.

#### Perimeter Zones

1. The first zone is the terrorist attack scene and is determined by responding units; the responding reaction force and the rescue services seal the area almost immediately.
2. The second zone serves as the coordination and preparation area for response to the event and the Joint Command Center is often located here. However,

the commander will often go between the attack scene and the Joint Command Center in the second zone. The location of the commander largely depends on the event and what the commander feels is important. The spokesperson and the press are often located in this area. Most importantly, this is the victims' area where they are triaged and treated. The Supervision group is located here to coordinate the efforts of the forces enter the inner zone.

3. The third zone is the sealing of the outer most limits. It is need to assist with the investigation, clearing of roads to the hospitals, and removing of spectators/protestors. Also occurring in the third zone are the attempts to catch those responsible for the attack and the prevention of further attacks.

*Note: In all zones it is important to take actions affecting other zones and coordinate actions to prevent other attacks.*

4. Zones may change due to other events, national/investigative interest, and ensuing activities or evaluation of the scene.
5. The evaluation must be done immediately, within the first 15-30 minutes.

#### Information Dissemination

1. Preliminary report with general overview of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and any officer safety information regarding secondary or radio controlled devices.
2. Critical that all available information be brought to the attention of the Bomb Squad – on site intelligence, threat reporting, background, prior bombings, etc.
3. Recommendation – FBI initiates FLASH message traffic to all bomb squads in the U.S.
4. Balance the requirement to get information disseminated immediately with the need to produce VERIFIED information that will not jeopardize the investigation
5. As the investigation proceeds, higher authorities will review the dissemination of information.
6. Bomb Squad Commander should coordinate the release of information on the bomb/device.

7. While providing information to the public is imperative, it is important to remember that a crime has occurred and specific details should not be released (such as bomb details including bomb data); careful coordination with the assigned spokesperson is critical.

#### Lethal Force Guidelines

1. To protect himself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. The priorities for this response: Saving Lives and eliminating future dangers.
2. To prevent a crime where the suspect's actions place persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury.
3. To apprehend a fleeing felon for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the use of lethal force where there is substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is delayed.
4. There is no exception to the law or use of lethal force policy when encountering a suspected or confirmed suicide/homicide bomber. Officer may not use lethal force to stop someone who is "merely" suspected of being a homicide bomber. Officers must have probable cause to believe the suspect is presenting an immediate threat to life before lethal force can be utilized. If an officer observes what appears to be an explosive device attached to the suspect, and believes the suspect presents an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officers or others, then lethal force is reasonable, since officers are trying "to prevent a crime where the suspect's actions place persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury."

Some indicative behaviors/external characteristics of attackers when initiating final phase of an attack

1. Suspects apparent emotional state doesn't seem to fit the situation
2. Suspects clothing is out of sync with the weather, his/her social position (suspect appears well groomed but clothing is sloppy) or location (wearing a coat inside a building).

3. Suspects clothing is loose
4. Suspect may be carrying heavy luggage, bag or wearing a back pack
5. Suspect keeps hands in pockets
6. Suspect repeatedly pats upper body with hands, as if double checking whether something has been forgotten.
7. If suspect is male, face is pale from recent shaving of beard
8. No obvious emotion seen on face/ affect seems flat
9. Eyes appear to be focused and vigilant
10. Suspect does not respond to authoritative voice commands or direct salutation from a distance.
11. Suspect appears to be drugged or “in a trance.”
12. Just prior to detonation the suspect may:
  - a. Place his or her hands above the head and shout a phrase.
  - b. Place hands and head close to the bomb to obliterate features permitting post-mortem identification.

#### Containment of the Bomber

1. NEVER approach the suspect/bomber
2. Anyone approaching the immobilized bomber must have lethal force capability
3. Do not allow the suicide bomber to move toward masses of people. If the Bomber is already mixed in with the masses of people or is already closing in on them
  - a. Sacrifice police dogs to take down the suicide bomber
  - b. Engage the bomber with lethal force.
4. Establish a security perimeter.
5. Evacuate endangered citizens. In open areas, firing a warning shot in the air to get members of the public in covered or prone position before engaging the bomber with lethal force may reduce the fragmentation effects of the bomber.
6. If a car bomb or other form of Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) is involved;

- a. Attempt to box it in using police and fire vehicles, commandeered heavy trucks, or hasty barricades and spike strips.
  - b. Utilize vehicles for cover, at the appropriate distance – cannot be so close that vehicles become threats.
  - c. Vehicles can be used to cordon off swept areas and control the flow of people/traffic.
7. Block avenues of approach to high-value targets (e.g. state and federal buildings) in the surrounding area.

#### Maintain Standoff Distance

- 1. Utilize a high ground sniper team with a clear field of fire to cover approaching Bomb Technicians
- 2. Utilize a robotic platform with video capability to approach the bomber
- 3. Seek appropriate cover and be aware of blast concussion rebound and shrapnel effects.
- 4. Minimum safety distance is 660 feet in all directions.
- 5. Do not get close to a suspected bomber.

*Note: If the bomber cannot reach the intended target, he or she may detonate to avoid arrest, and, in the process, kill as many law enforcement officers as possible.*

- 6. If the bomber wants to surrender, or is wounded or dead, maintain standoff distance.

*Note: Bombers appearing to surrender may use this ruse to draw to draw in unsuspecting law enforcement personnel. Even if the bomber sincerely wishes to surrender, he or she may be carrying a bomb that can be triggered by a third party (by cell phone or radio wave).*

- 7. Immediately search the area for suspicious personnel, a third party (Handler). This individual may have the capability to trigger the bomb by cell phone. Use of deadly force may be required to eliminate the threat by the handler.
- 8. Dead and wounded suspects and their possessions may also carry secondary command-detonated devices or dead-man switches and other forms of booby traps.

9. Bomber may detonate when falling due to use of mercury switch fuzing.
10. If the bomber is neutralized without an explosion, do not approach the bomber until cleared to do so by bomb disposal or other authorized personnel.
11. If the system fails to initiate, do not roll suspected bomber on chest or side to cuff, cuff with palms outward.
12. If a bomber wants to surrender, direct him or her to remove the explosive device or items carried and all clothing at standoff ranges.  
*Note: This protocol will not play well in the media, so be sure to enforce press-access restrictions.*
13. Have subject show hands-palms open.
14. Have subject remove all upper body clothing & turn 360 degrees before allowed to approach. Look for a bomb switch on the torso area or in the hands.
15. Challenge from cover/stand-off distance – One (1) officer should issue commands to bomber to avoid confusion  
*NOTE: Expect a secondary device or secondary suicide bomber in a few minutes. Suicide Bombers work in pairs with second bomber or timed device for rescuers.*
16. Designate a Contact Person and Cover personnel with appropriate firepower.
17. Work from cover & use verbal commands or hand signals to direct.

#### Recommended Separation Distance

1. Person Borne Explosive Device
  - a. Evacuation of bystanders
    - Minimum – 100m (300 feet)
    - Optimal – 150m (450 feet)
2. Vehicle Borne Explosive Device
  - Car: Minimum – 250m (800 feet) behind hard cover, 1000m (3250 feet) in the open
  - Truck: Minimum – 400m (1300 feet)

Define the circumstances when lethal force is justified.

1. Lethal force is justified if the suspect represents a significant threat of death or serious injury to an officer or others.

*Note: Federal laws and rulings are better attuned to the type of national security threat that suicide bombers represent from both a criminal and civil liability perspective.*

2. The law does not require that the threat of death or serious injury be imminent.
3. One need not wait until a suicide bomber makes a move or takes other action potentially sufficient to carry out the bombing when officers have reasonable bias to believe that the suspect has the capability to detonate a bomb. The threat of such use is, in most instances, sufficient justification to employ deadly force.
4. An officer need only determine that the use of deadly force is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

If lethal force is justified or authorized, aim for the head.

1. Instantaneous incapacitation is required to neutralize a suicide bomber's imminent act
2. Failure to incapacitate immediately may allow the bomber to trigger/initiate the device resulting in mass casualties. Consideration must be given to the fact that suicide bombs have a 360-degree killing zone and casualty radius of several hundred feet.
3. Less-lethal tactics are not designed for immediate incapacitation and are likely to result in detonation of the device.
4. Suicide devices worn on the torso should be considered impact sensitive to bullets. Police officers are trained to fire at center body mass. Using this tactic against suicide bombers is inappropriate for two reasons.
  - a. It may only wound the bomber, and a wounded bomber may still detonate the device.
  - b. If a round hits the explosive device, it may detonate.
5. If lethal force is justified, all shots should be aimed at the bomber's head-

specifically;



- a. At the tip of the nose when facing the bomber,
  - b. At the point of the ear canal from the side,
  - c. About one inch below the base of the skull from behind
6. An accurately placed head shot will terminate the bomber before he or she can take action to detonate the explosive device and will not accidentally set off the device.
7. A fragmenting, high-velocity shot from a firearm such as an AR-15 at any of the above mentioned areas is ideal for immediately terminating the threat.  
*Note: When using lethal force, remember to fire from cover to avoid the effects of a potential explosion.*
8. In some instances an officer or officers may attempt to hold down a suicide bomber without success. Under such circumstances, take the head shot by placing the pistol directly to the bomber's head in one of the aforementioned locations.
9. Under no circumstances are "tasers" or other electrical discharge devices to be utilized against a bomber, as the charge they deliver may detonate the explosive device.

#### Radio-frequency suppression and pre-detonation.

1. Jamming devices can block the signals of cell phone- and command-detonated systems. These jamming devices create an electronic barrier around an explosive device that stops radio signals and cell phone calls from detonating it.
2. Jamming devices can also protect facilities and vehicles from command-detonated systems.
3. Other electronic systems exist that will pre-detonate radio-controlled bombs by broadcasting signals across the radio wave spectrum. Infrared, radar, garage door openers, motion sensors, and photocells are less typical methods of detonation, but various countermeasures exist to suppress or pre-detonate devices initiated by these methods.

#### Force protection operations.

1. Defending the forces that respond to a suicide bomber must be a primary consideration.
2. Not only do law enforcement assets need to be protected, but so do fire and emergency medical technicians (EMT's) and ambulance drivers.
3. Secondary and tertiary explosive devices may be placed in likely command post and triage locations or along avenues of approach or egress from the incident scene. Typically, such explosive devices are set on 20-minute timers to target responding forces enroute or clustered together in "kill zones".
4. Suicide bombers have posed as emergency responders, such as ambulance drivers, to explode a vehicular bomb in the midst of emergency services personnel.
5. At a minimum, command post and triage areas and avenues of approach and egress must be cleared for bombs, unknown personnel must be identified, snipers and guards must be posted, and responders should not cluster in large groups.
6. Defensive operations should also include counter-surveillance teams that look for opposing force members engaging in intelligence collection against responding forces.
7. At a minimum, responders should wear personal protection equipment such as gauze masks, eyewear, gloves, and boot coverings, as they will encounter body fluids and body parts in the blast area, and blood borne diseases may be present.

*Note: Full scale decontamination capability may also be required if suicide bombers begin using chemical or radiological devices*

#### Post detonation

1. Relay as much information as possible to communications concerning conditions, injuries, damage, and personnel and equipment requirements.
2. Remain alert to secondary devices
3. Establish as large a crime scene perimeter as possible.

4. Witnesses need to be questioned quickly and thoroughly soon after the blast.
5. Establish appropriate media staging area
6. Treat and process the area as a crime scene
7. Bomb Unit arrives and immediately begins search for secondary devices
8. Outside the limited area, command post is checked; crowds and cars are also searched with K9 teams.

*Note: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has developed a “Suicide Bomb Extended Message - Health and Safety Information for the First Hours”. It’s a guide for the PIO/Media to inform non-emergency responders located in the vicinity of the blast what actions they should take.*

<http://www.bt.cdc.gov/firsthours/suicidebomb/messages.asp>

#### Secondary devices

1. Aggressive and expeditious search of immediate area, followed on by more detailed search.
2. The search for secondary device looks at areas near the wounded, concentration point of the wounded, near the concentration of the rescue teams, command post, and crowds.
3. Second wave of officers conducts search of scene (two pairs of eyes on each area) VIN/Plate check.
4. Check all cars, dumpsters, bags, etc – once cleared, mark “safe” according to an accepted marking system.
5. One person assigns search areas for all officers – define and prioritize overlapping search zones
6. Explosive Detection K9 Units deployed with Bomb Technicians
7. Initial search by law enforcement, if something suspicious identified, then bomb technicians conduct intrusive search following request by Incident Commander.
8. Bomb Technicians determine extent of search for 2<sup>nd</sup> device and make the determination of area to conduct physical search of vehicles on the street.
9. Tag and log searched areas with Command Post.

10. Be prepared to adjust cordon, or possibly evacuate, given the identification of a secondary device or a follow-on attack.

#### Medical Response

1. Medical teams arrive at the site and immediately begin evacuating the wounded, while simultaneously the bomb technicians search for a secondary device.
2. Dead stay on the scene, injured are treated by EMS or taken to the hospitals
3. Designated officer rides to hospital with the injured – ensures no complications
  - a. Briefs hospital personnel of possible secondary devices
  - b. Insure preservation of evidence (if found)
  - c. Hospital should be made aware of the possibility of a second device or attack and be prepared to take appropriate measures.
4. Deployment of forces to hospitals because they can become a target, and there is usually a need to restore public order.

#### Establish a triage area and crime scene investigation perimeters.

1. The triage area for injured victims should be outside of the crime scene perimeter and outside of the explosive range of a secondary device on the bomber or in his or her vehicle.
2. An inner-perimeter crime scene will contain the explosion site or the spot where the bomber was engaged with lethal force. Access to this perimeter must be restricted because of explosive hazards it may contain.
3. An outer perimeter where first responders and investigators will work should also be established.
4. In the case of vehicle bombs, more powerful explosives, and other considerations, a third perimeter evacuation area may also be required.
5. If the bomber wore an explosive vest, expect to find the severed head a good distance away from the body. Finding a severed head is one of the quickest ways to identify a suicide bomber crime scene.
6. In the case of an explosive belt, expect to find the body severed in half or each leg blown away from the body.

### Initial Investigation

1. After the search and secure procedures are completed, but during the initial investigation, the bomb labs, crime scene technicians and other authorities arrive at the scene.
2. Bomb Lab technicians produce an initial report to the Commander and Bomb Technicians containing expert opinion and technical information.
3. Bomb technicians will assist the Bomb Lab in collecting residue in order to utilize manpower to clear the scene.
4. Crime scene technicians assist with victim identification.
5. Other authorities arriving on the scene are responsible for collecting body parts, clearing debris and turning life to normal.

### Suicide bomber logistical support team escape and evasion.

1. A suicide bomber may or may not have a logistical support team.
2. Affinity suicide bombers will most likely be acting alone or possibly with the help of a confederate.
3. A logistical support team may exist, and if so, part of it could be attempting to flee the area surrounding the incident scene.
4. A perimeter should be established outside of the crime scene, responder, and possible evacuation zones to attempt to capture withdrawing suicide bomber support-team members.

### Disruptive targeting mitigation.

1. Mitigation strategies should include using public information officers, managing the press and restricting their access to the incident scene (including enforcing no-fly-zone restrictions on press helicopters and not permitting the videotaping of suspects forced to remove clothing), offering grief counseling, and working to clean up the incident scene quickly.
2. The potential for a terrorist sting operation should also be considered. This is a contrived incident in which law enforcement is forced to kill an individual they have probable cause to believe is a suicide bomber moving against a target, but who turns out not to be carrying a bomb.

*Note: This type of operation would serve as terrorist propaganda to disrupt national response efforts.*

#### Rehabilitation

1. Gradual downgrading of the deployment occurs and roadblocks are removed.
2. Assistance is provided to local authorities as needed.
3. Investigation and victim identification is complete.
4. Most important during this step is summarizing of the event, which include debriefings and press information, and the drawing of lessons learned.

#### Mission debriefing, lessons learned, and recommendations.

1. Immediately after a suicide bomber incident has been dealt with, the responders, intelligence groups, and other incident support personnel must conduct a mission debriefing.
2. A full investigation should be conducted through interviews with locals (friends, acquaintances, and neighbors of the bomber) to determine if they saw suspicious acts in the days, weeks, and months prior to the attack.
3. Full details from interviews should be documented and then put into a timeline to look for pre-incident patterns (be mindful of legal discovery ramifications).
4. Lesson learned and recommendations generated should be shared both within the area where the incident took place and with other law enforcement and responder groups throughout the United States.

#### Psychological Debriefing

1. Individuals involved should have a stress briefing within 24 hours of the Incident.
2. Post trauma sessions occur with a psychologist because it is important to talk about what was observed at the scene of the attack; it is important to talk about what was witnessed especially if the victims were children and their were a lot of body parts.
3. Post trauma stress disorder may occur after the incident with many victims; it is essential to notice any irregular behavior changes and refer the individual to the necessary help.

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